This paper examines why, in contrast to the predictions of finance theory, firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price. The empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after-tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted. This cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor's incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond's coupon. Because of taxation, however, the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric, and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert. The results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.

This study investigates the effect on stock prices of seasoned equity offerings. The results demonstrate that the announcement of equity offerings reduces stock prices significantly. For industrial issues, regression results indicate that announcement day price reduction is significantly and negatively related to the size of the equity offering. The results appear not to be explained by changes in capital structure associated with the equity offerings. The findings are consistent both with the hypothesis that equity issues are viewed by investors as negative signals and with the hypothesis that there is a downward sloping demand for a firm's shares.

ABSTRACT This paper examines why, in contrast to the predictions of finance theory, firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price. The empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after‐tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted. This cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor's incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond's coupon. Because of taxation, however, the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric, and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert. The results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.

This study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms' shareholders. Bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty-one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids. These results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders' gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs. Bidders' abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners, and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful. Though the gains are larger prior to 1969, merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms' shareholders. The results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies. The findings of this study are consistent with value-maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms.

ABSTRACT This paper presents an aging analysis of 741 high yield bonds and finds default, exchange, and call percentages substantially higher than reported in earlier studies. By December 31, 1988, cumulative defaults are 34 percent for bonds issued in 1977 and 1978 and range from 19 to 27 percent for issue years 1979–1983 and from 3 to 9 percent for issue years 1984–1986. Exchanges are also a significant factor although they often are followed by default. Moreover, a significant percentage of high yield debt, 26–47 percent for 1977–1982, has been called. By December 31, 1988, approximately one third of the bonds issued in 1977–1982 has defaulted or been exchanged, and an additional one third had been called. On average, only 28 percent of these issues are still outstanding. There is no evidence that early results for more recent issue years differ markedly from issue years 1977 to 1982.

This paper presents an aging analysis of 741 high yield bonds and finds default, exchange, and call percentages substantially higher than reported in earlier studies. By December 31, 1988, cumulative defaults are 34 percent for bonds issued in 1977 and 1978 and range from 19 to 27 percent for issue years 1979–1983 and from 3 to 9 percent for issue years 1984–1986. Exchanges are also a significant factor although they often are followed by default. Moreover, a significant percentage of high yield debt, 26–47 percent for 1977–1982, has been called. By December 31, 1988, approximately one third of the bonds issued in 1977–1982 has defaulted or been exchanged, and an additional one third had been called. On average, only 28 percent of these issues are still outstanding. There is no evidence that early results for more recent issue years differ markedly from issue years 1977 to 1982.