ABSTRACT We study determinants of internal control reporting decisions under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX 404) using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. We find that only a minority of these firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time. Further, the probability of reporting existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs, firm size, non‐audit fees, and the presence of a large audit firm; it is positively associated with financial distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses and restatements, and recent auditor and management changes. These results provide evidence that detection and disclosure incentives play a role in whether existing material weaknesses are reported, which has implications for the effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing investors with advance warning of potential accounting problems.

ABSTRACT When larger market values of equity result in being subject to costly regulation, firms have incentives to shift their sources of financing toward debt and away from equity. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a setting to provide evidence of such incentives. Smaller firms were granted several reprieves and eventually exempted from the internal control audit requirements of SOX Section 404, which many consider the most costly and onerous aspect of SOX. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that relative to control firms, firms just below the regulatory threshold have increased propensities to issue debt, decreased propensities to issue equity, and increased leverage levels in the post-SOX period. These results are consistent with firms altering their financing choices to maintain their exempt status and demonstrate an economic consequence of regulatory regimes that are tiered by equity values.

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ABSTRACT We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls.