There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a game form that is feasible, both for equilibrium and disequilibrium strategies, continuous, and for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of (constrained) Walrasian equilibria for all pure exchange economies. The game form allows agents to behave strategically both with respect to their preferences and their initial endowments.

Following the 1999 Israeli elections, the winning candidate's (Ehud Barak's) party was fined 3.2 million dollars for violating Israel's campaign financing laws by exceeding the spending cap imposed and raising 1.2 million dollars illegally (see Time Europe, 2000).While adhering to the strict NCAA recruiting regulations, the University of Oregon spent 3 million dollars to make their football locker room the "best anywhere, including the NFL" (Lexington Herald Leader, 2003).When asked about the previous salary cap in the UK Football league, players said that "it [the cap] was so artificial that clubs paid money in brown paper envelopes."(BBC2, Newsnight 2002).In all these cases, there officially existed a rigid spending cap.However, they show that even though a cap exists: The cap might not be easily enforced.When enforced, the penalty may just be financial rather than a change in outcome.The cap may be enforced and adhered to, but there may also be alternate perhaps less effective (hence more costly) means of spending.We also see that the flexible nature of the cap is often built into the rules by examining the salary caps of the four major US sports leagues where the caps are routinely exceeded.In baseball and basketball, surpassing the cap invokes a pure financial penalty, called a luxury tax, which is proportional to the excess.In football, while the cap is stated in terms of salaries, many teams use signing bonuses as a way to circumvent it.In ice hockey, there is a dual cap system, where the luxury tax is invoked on salaries falling between the two caps and signing bonuses are an allowed method to exceed the

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios include the selection of a candidate, the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sports event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism in which agents submit bids to determine the winning project. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient and immune to any coalitional deviations. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds. (JEL D78, D62) 1 Reaching decisions about the location of noxious facilities, such as dump-sites, environmentally hazardous plants, nuclear power generators and the like, is a highly contentious issue. For instance, in February 2000, the US Senate decided that nationwide nuclear waste would be shipped to the Yucca mountain site in Nevada (conditional to it being approved as a high-level nuclear waste repository). Despite the attractive compensation package, the State of Nevada voiced vehement opposition. President

The article focuses on spending caps, and compares those used in politics with many examples in sports economics. In 1999, the party of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was fined $3.2 million for exceeding Israel's campaign finance caps. Financing caps by the National Collegiate Athletics Association did not prevent The University of Oregon from spending $3 million on their football locker room. Mathematical models are provided in order to prove that spending caps will not necessarily have their intended effect, as they increase the total expended amount by increasing the risk of being fined.