We study gender differences in on-time loan payment responsiveness to collection mechanisms using randomized dunning text messages sent to 17,545 FinTech borrowers. Reminder text messages significantly reduce delinquency rates relative to a no-message control, with messages incorporating social or financial incentives proving more effective. Women are more responsive to social pressure, while men are more sensitive to financial incentives. These results are robust to observable control variables and matching methods. Channel analyses indicate that gender differences in responsiveness to the existence and size of the incentive explain the observed gender differences under the social incentive treatment. However, only gender differences in sensitivity to the existence of incentives explain the gender difference in financial incentive treatments. These findings inform practitioners and policymakers that some seemingly gender-neutral practices may create unintended gender disparities in financial markets.

Policy makers and researchers are concerned that the expected credit loss (ECL) approach may exacerbate procyclicality. Using administrative loan‐level and firm‐level data in China, we find that banks adopting the ECL model reduced their credit supply and became more prudent in lending decisions after the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic, compared to banks using the incurred credit loss (ICL) approach. Our findings are more pronounced for banks that experienced greater loan loss provisions induced by ECL and for firms with higher credit risk. The credit contraction persisted throughout our sample period. We further document that firms more exposed to ECL banks experienced larger reductions in loans, assets, liabilities, and revenue after the pandemic began than those more exposed to ICL banks. These findings support the conjecture that the ECL approach may exacerbate procyclicality.

We analyze lending by traditional as well as fintech lenders during COVID-19. Comparing samples of fintech and bank loan records across the outbreak, we find that fintech companies are more likely to expand credit access to new and financially constrained borrowers after the start of the pandemic. However, this increased credit provision may not be sustainable; the delinquency rate of fintech loans triples after the outbreak, but there is no significant change in the delinquency of bank loans. Borrowers holding both loan types prioritize the payment of bank loans. These results shed light on the benefits provided by shadow banking in a crisis and hint at the potential fragility of such institutions when delinquency rates spike.