T ESTED with regional data for the United States, the neoclassical growth model has yielded inconsistent results. Borts and Stein (1964, chapter 3) employed a simple growth model relating interregional factor movements to factor price differentials, but found little evidence of responsiveness. In a recent paper Smith (1973) found such a model consistent with the long-run factor mobility experience of states. Since a similar model was employed in both studies, the contrasting results may be ascribed to the use of inappropriate data in the test of the model of Borts and Stein, and/or inadequate model specification. They tested their model on the nonagricultural sector of each state, while Smith's model is tested on aggregate state data. Use of data on the nonagricultural sector of each state embodied the implicit assumption that capital and labor move only between states from one nonagricultural sector to another, and ignored the possibility of intersectoral factor movements. Smith avoided this potential problem by aggregating each state's output to a single sector. Thus, only interstate factor movements were relevant. In this paper, both intersectoral (within states) and interstate factor movements are considered. Factor movements affect the growth rate of a sector's capital-labor ratio, which determines the growth rate of the wage level.

This paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits. The unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union, in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative, are used to develop the objective function. This is based on a comparison of the credit union's rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower-saver conflict. The principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members.

ABSTRACT This paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits. The unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union, in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative, are used to develop the objective function. This is based on a comparison of the credit union's rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower‐saver conflict. The principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members.

Donald J. Smith, Thomas F. Cargill, Robert A. Meyer, An Economic Theory of a Credit Union, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 36, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty Ninth Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Denver, September 5-7, 1980 (May, 1981), pp. 519-528