Abstract. This study investigates variations in covenants across different classes of preferred stock and describes the role of accounting numbers in such covenants. The findings indicate that covenants in contracts that protect the priority of the claims of preferred stockholders are more prevalent in very debt‐like preferred stock issues when there are greater anticipated conflicts over claim priority with common stockholders. When the preferred stock issues take on common equity‐like interests, there is less opportunity for common stockholders to gain from diluting the priority of the claims of the preferred stockholders. Consequently, the contracts are not configured to the same extent of restrictions on wealth transfers. Audited accounting numbers are utilized extensively in these covenants, and the contracts adjust these numbers to limit management's discretion in their choice of accounting policies for relaxing the covenants. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent les différences observées dans les clauses restrictives associées à diverses catégories d'actions privilégiées et décrivent le rôle des données comptables chiffrées dans ces clauses. Les conclusions de l'étude révèlent que les clauses restrictives des contrats qui assurent la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés sont plus répandues dans les émissions d'actions privilégiées s'apparentant très étroitement à des titres d'emprunt lorsque les conflits prévus avec les actionnaires ordinaires en ce qui a trait à la priorité des créances sont plus importants. Lorsque les actions privilégiées émises s'apparentent davantage à des actions ordinaires, les actionnaires ordinaires sont moins susceptibles de tirer profit d'une dilution de la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés. Par conséquent, les contrats ne sont pas structurés de façon à contenir des restrictions de même portée sur les transferts de richesse. Les données comptables vérifiées sont abondamment utilisées dans ce genre de clauses restrictives, et les contrats prévoient l'ajustement des données chiffrées de façon à limiter la discrétion dont jouit la direction dans le choix des conventions comptables susceptibles d'assouplir le caractère restrictif des clauses.

This study investigates whether fee dependence within the audit firms’ offices jeopardises auditor independence. Fee dependence is examined at both the national audit firm level as well as the local office level and in a setting where public disclosure of fees is mandatory. We focus our tests on audit fee dependence and at the same time we control for the effects of non-audit service fee dependence post the 1989 mergers. We operationalise the exercise of independent judgement in auditing by the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. If fee dependence affects auditors’ independent judgement, then auditors are less likely to qualify the accounts. The study's results show that the level of auditor fee dependence does not affect auditor propensity to issue unqualified audit opinions. The findings remain robust to a number of sensitivity tests including the analyses controlling for the effects of non-audit service fee dependence and other settings in which there is heightened pressure on auditors to confront the effects of fee dependence on exercising independent audit judgement.

Abstract This paper investigates brand name, industry specialization, and leadership audit pricing in the wake of the mergers that created the Big 6 and the Big 5 accounting firms. For samples of Australian listed public companies in each of the postmerger years 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1998, we estimate national audit fee premiums for the Big 6/5 auditors and the industry specialists and leaders. We find limited support for the ability of the Big 6/5 to obtain fee premiums over non‐Big 6/5 for those industries not having specialist auditors. Nonspecialist Big 6/5 auditors are able to obtain fee premiums over nonspecialist non‐Big 6/5 auditors for those industries having specialist auditors. However, this result only holds among the smaller half of our sample. We do not find strong support for the presence of industry specialist premiums in the postmerger years, especially after 1990, using various definitions of industry specialist. We find, at best, limited support for the presence of industry leadership premiums. The evidence suggests that after the Big 8/6 audit firm mergers, some caution is required in generalizing the Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995 finding of national market industry specialist premiums. More generally, the study raises questions about the tenuous link between the concept of specialization and national market‐share statistics.

This study examines the role of auditor industry expertise in the pricing of Big 5 audits in Australia. We test if the audit market prices an auditor's firm-wide industry expertise, or alternatively if the audit market only prices office-level expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. We document that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with industry expertise when the auditor is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the top two firms nationally in the industry. However, the top two firms nationally do not earn a premium in cities where they are not city leaders. We further document that national leadership rankings are, in fact, driven by the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. Thus, the overall evidence supports that the market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia is primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets.