The paper studies the motivations behind banks’ shareholding of non-financial firms using a panel of large Italian companies in the period 1994–2000. Empirical evidence shows that banks are shareholders of companies that are less profitable, have experienced slower growth, are more indebted, are endowed with collateral and have hard time to repay their debt out of current income. Banks are more likely to hold shares in companies they lend to. Overall the evidence suggests that there is complementarity between bank equity holding and lending. A plausible explanation is the shareholder–debtholder conflict, the evidence is weakly compatible with governance and information hypotheses.

We analyze the optimal capital structure of a bank issuing countercyclical contingent capital, i.e., notes to be converted into common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions. A comparison of the main effects produced by the countercyclical asset with the simple equity-debt capital structure, the non-countercyclical contingent capital and the countercyclical callable bond is conducted. We demonstrate that this type of asset reduces the spread of straight debt and is effective in reducing the asset substitution incentive. The reduction of bankruptcy costs is strong only when the countercyclicality feature is removed. Contingent capital is useful for macroprudential regulation and we show that the countercyclical feature is important depending on priorities (moderate the asset substitution incentive or reduce bankruptcy costs).

We investigate the portfolio frontier and risk premia in equilibrium when institutional investors aim to minimize the tracking error variance and to attain a certain ESG score (ESG mandate). Provided that a negative ESG premium is priced by the market, we show that an ESG mandate can reduce the mean–variance inefficiency of the portfolio frontier when the asset manager targets a limited over-performance return with respect to the benchmark. In equilibrium, with mean–variance investors and asset managers endowed with an ESG mandate, a negative ESG premium arises if the mandate is binding for asset managers. The negative ESG premium is due to the ESG constraint (institutional investors over-invest in virtuous ESG stocks). We find empirical evidence of such a negative premium in the US market.