In this paper, we establish sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and the distribution of treatment effects in parametric switching regime models with normal mean-variance mixture errors and in the semi-parametric switching regime models of Heckman (1990). Our results for parametric switching regime models with normal mean-variance mixture errors extend some existing results for the Gaussian switching regime model and our results for semi-parametric switching regime models supplement the point identification results of Heckman (1990). Compared with the corresponding sharp bounds when selection is random, we observe that self-selection tightens the bounds on the joint distribution of the potential outcomes and the distribution of treatment effects. These bounds depend on the identified model parameters only and can be easily estimated once the identified model parameters are estimated. The important issue of inference is briefly discussed.

ABSTRACT This paper studies whether and how firms’ enhanced public disclosures of patent filings can spill over to the managerial labor market. Consistent with these disclosures crowding out the demand for directors and senior managers’ (DSMs) private information, I find that their external employment opportunities deteriorate when firms disclose patent information more timely. This effect is more pronounced when the strategic value of the disclosed information is higher and when DSMs face fewer barriers to sharing information. Additionally, the decline in their human capital value is reflected in a diminished role in transferring timely information about technological innovations. Collectively, these results shed light on how public disclosures can shape the managerial labor market by substituting private information flows between firms through DSM ties. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources indicated herein. JEL Classifications: D23; G38; M12; M41.

Instrumental variables (IVs) and control variables are frequently used to assist researchers in investigating endogenous treatment effects. When used together, their identities are typically assumed to be known. However, in many practical situations, one is faced with a large and mixed set of covariates, some of which can serve as excluded IVs, some can serve as control variables, whereas others should be discarded from the model. It is often not possible to classify them based on economic theory alone. This paper proposes a data-driven method to classify a large (increasing with sample size) set of covariates into excluded IVs, controls, and noise to be discarded. The resulting IV estimator is shown to have the oracle property (to have the same first-order asymptotic distribution as the IV estimator, assuming the true classification is known).

ABSTRACT This paper provides descriptive evidence on how stock market participants use Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) to process investment‐related information. Using a data set of 1.7 million stock‐related queries from one of China's largest GenAI platforms during the first half of 2024, we document that user queries address a wide range of topics and tasks and vary systematically with usage intensity and financial sophistication. Query activity increases around corporate disclosure events, but these increases largely track contemporaneous media coverage. We also find evidence consistent with a substitution between the informativeness of voluntary managerial disclosures and investors' reliance on GenAI. Continued platform engagement more likely follows answers that are concise and contain directionally accurate trading signals. Over time, users' subsequent queries increasingly reflect the specificity and financial terminology present in earlier GenAI answers. At the market level, GenAI usage is associated with higher measures of informed trading and lower liquidity, while aggregated sentiment in GenAI‐generated answers correlates with same‐day abnormal returns, particularly when user feedback is positive. Overall, our findings offer insights into early‐stage GenAI adoption by retail investors and inform discussions on how GenAI shapes information processing in financial markets.

This article studies competition under information heterogeneity in selection markets and examines the impact of public information regulations aimed at reducing information asymmetries between competing firms. We develop a novel model and introduce new empirical strategies to analyse imperfect competition in markets where firms have heterogeneous information about consumers, vary in cost structures, and offer differentiated products. Using data from the Italian auto insurance market, we find substantial differences in the precision of risk ratings across insurers, and those with less accurate risk-rating algorithms tend to have more efficient cost structures. We assess the equilibrium effects of giving firms equal access to aggregated risk information from a centralized bureau. This policy significantly reduces prices by increasing competition, leading to a 15.7% boost in consumer surplus, almost reaching the efficiency benchmark where firms have full knowledge of consumers’ true risk. Aggregating information through the bureau favours low-risk consumers and reduces average costs by 12 euros per contract through more efficient insurer–insuree matching.