Theories such as Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] predict a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected return when investors do not diversify their portfolio. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang [2006. The cross-section of volatility and expected returns. Journal of Finance 61, 259–299], however, find that monthly stock returns are negatively related to the one-month lagged idiosyncratic volatilities. I show that idiosyncratic volatilities are time-varying and thus, their findings should not be used to imply the relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected return. Using the exponential GARCH models to estimate expected idiosyncratic volatilities, I find a significantly positive relation between the estimated conditional idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns. Further evidence suggests that Ang et al.'s findings are largely explained by the return reversal of a subset of small stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities.

We assume executives managing corporate financial policy consider the firm's current and target leverage, investment plans, anticipated cash flows, and consequences of alternative sequences of financing transactions, operating within efficient markets. Our analysis yields time-series and cross-sectional predictions for management of investment spending and leverage; use of maturity, priority, and convertibility covenants; and management of dividends, share repurchases, cash balances, and credit lines. Our evidence from 8608 SEOs covering 1970–2015 is consistent with implications of our theory, helps to resolve an array of issues in corporate finance, and offers a step toward a more unified analysis of rational corporate financial management.

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.