ABSTRACT This study addresses the two-way process in which a subordinate and a superior engage in influence activities (bottom-up) and favoritism (top-down) in subjective Performance Evaluation. The research context is the Chinese government's evaluation of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of China (SASAC). We analyze archival records of the government's evaluation scores, score adjustments, and evaluation ratings given to 63 SOEs between 2005 and 2007. These analyses are also interpreted based on insights gained from in-depth field interviews with SASAC officials and chief financial officers (CFOs) of SOEs. Results indicate that the political connection of SOE CFOs, the geographic proximity of SOE headquarters to the SASAC central office, and political rank of the firm affect the SASAC's evaluations. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement.

ABSTRACT This study investigates how adopting new performance measures affects the decision process through which supervisors make subjective adjustments. In our setting, the Chinese government substituted economic value added (EVA) for return on equity (ROE) in the performance score formula it uses to evaluate State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In accordance with the Chinese government's objective to increase the capital efficiency of SOEs, supervisors shifted the weight in subjective adjustment decisions from ROE to EVA after EVA adoption. Consistent with EVA adoption creating fairness concerns, however, supervisors did not penalize SOEs for performing poorly on EVA when they performed well on ROE, and accomplished this by shifting the weight from EVA back to ROE. Additional analyses suggest that personal preferences motivated supervisors to make these lenient subjective adjustments. Overall, our findings indicate that adopting new performance measures creates fairness concerns that motivate supervisors to consider their personal preferences in subjective adjustment decisions.

ABSTRACT We examine the stock price impact of corporate site visits using a unique data set of site visits to listed firms in China. Our main findings are as follows. First, the market reaction around corporate site visits is statistically and economically significant and is stronger for group visits, visits conducted by mutual fund managers, visits covering accounting and finance topics, visits to firms with poor information environments, and visits to manufacturing firms. Second, the stock returns around site visits are positively associated with firms’ future performance. Third, the changes in visiting funds’ holdings are more predictive of firms’ future performance than those of nonvisiting funds. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that site visits are important venues for investors to collect information about firms and make informed trades.

ABSTRACT Using data from a large telecom service provider in China between 2014 and 2019, we examine the impact of being passed over for promotion on subsequent performance for middle managers. Specifically, we find that there is a negative association between high promotion probability and post-pass over performance changes. Such negative association is less pronounced when bonus incentives are stronger and when promotions are more predictable. Our research highlights a hidden cost of promotion incentives and strategies organizations can use to mitigate this unintended negative effect for promotion pass over on high performers. Data Availability: The data used in this study are proprietary. Access to the data may be granted upon request, subject to the approval of the data providers and compliance with confidentiality agreements. JEL Classifications: M41.

ABSTRACT Revenue-sharing contracts allow firms that are distant from their target markets to leverage sellers' local expertise. Although these contracts align incentives in operational decisions, they also introduce the potential for sellers to underreport revenues. We analyze film-level box office data from 7,309 Chinese cinemas and find that cinemas report significantly lower revenues for foreign films than for comparable domestic films, consistent with foreign producers being less able to monitor reported revenues due to geographic distance. The underreporting of foreign films is lower in cities with widespread mobile payments, in multi-unit cinemas, and when foreign films have more predictable revenues, suggesting institutional factors that increase detection likelihood can mitigate underreporting. Further tests indicate the lower reported box office revenues of foreign films is not due to government intervention. Our findings provide novel evidence of product-level misreporting under revenue-sharing contracts and offer insights on mitigating these risks in international markets. Data availability: Data are available via the sources specified in the paper. The authors greatly appreciate the data supplied by EntGroup (http://english.entgroup.com.cn/enbase.html) but are not able to share the data based on the agreement with Entgroup. JEL Classifications: F00; L82; M40.