ABSTRACT This paper shows that the liquidation value of collateral depends on the interdependency between borrower and collateral risk. Using transaction‐level data on short‐term repurchase agreements (repo), we show that borrowers pay a premium of 1.1 to 2.6 basis points when their default risk is positively correlated with the risk of the collateral that they pledge. Moreover, we show that borrowers internalize this premium when making their collateral choices. Loan‐level credit registry data suggest that the results extend to the corporate loan market as well.

Using a pan-European data set of 8.5 million firms, we find that firms with high debt financing invest relatively more, than otherwise similar firms, if they are operating in sectors facing good global growth opportunities. The positive impact of a marginal increase in debt on investment in good-global-growth-opportunities sectors disappears if firm debt is already excessive, if it is dominated by short maturities, and during systemic banking crises. Our results are consistent with theories of the disciplining role of debt, as well as with models highlighting the negative link between firm- and bank-related agency problems and corporate investment.