In certain industries, sales agent contracts include provisions for sales commissions and clawbacks of commissions if clients are not retained. We show that contracts with these features arise in environments having up‐front selling costs recouped from ongoing sales; heterogeneous customers; limited agent access to capital markets; and imperfect commitment to long‐term contracts. We test the model using information on insurance sales agent contracts from New Zealand prior to and after bank entry into insurance sales. The evidence indicates that banks cream‐skimmed customers. We predict that this should reduce the values of sales commissions and clawbacks. The data support this prediction.

Many but not all firms have the freedom to choose liability rules. In some countries, service professions have unlimited liability rules imposed by government; historically, banks in some countries faced unlimited liability. Why do governments impose unlimited liability? This is the question we address. With a simple model, we illustrate the agency conflicts in firms. Limited liability solves these conflicts efficiently. Unlimited liability raises the cost of capital; inefficiently small firms result. But under some conditions, selectively applied unlimited liability rules protect rents. We test several propositions with data on Scottish banking and U.S. law firms

Many, but not all, firms have the freedom to choose liability rules. In some countries, service professions have unlimited liability rules imposed by government; historically, banks in some countries faced unlimited liability. Why do governments impose unlimited liability? This is the question the authors address. With a simple model, they illustrate the agency conflicts in firms. Limited liability solves these conflicts efficiently. Unlimited liability raises the cost of capital; inefficiently small firms result. But under some conditions, selectively-applied unlimited liability rules protect rents. The authors test several propositions with data on Scottish banking and U.S. law firms. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

Recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient. Efficiency claims have proven contentious, however, for exclusive dealing, a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer's product from stocking substitute brands. This paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency. Opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive, to the view that it is always procompetitive. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product,