This article develops a theoretical model to explain the permanent price impact asymmetry between buyer- and seller-initiated block trades (the permanent price impact of buys is larger than that of sells). The model shows how the trading strategy of institutional portfolio managers creates a difference between the information content of buys and sells. The main implication of the model is that the history of price performance influences the asymmetry: the longer the run-up in a stock's price, the less the asymmetry. The intensity of institutional trading and the frequency of information events affect the asymmetry differently depending on recent price performance.

This article develops a theoretical model to explain the permanent price impact asymmetry between buyer- and seller-initiated block trades (the permanent price impact of buys is larger than that of sells). The model shows how the trading strategy of institutional portfolio managers creates a difference between the information content of buys and sells. The main implication of the model is that the history of price performance influences the asymmetry: the longer the run-up in a stock's price, the less the asymmetry. The intensity of institutional trading and the frequency of information events affect the asymmetry differently depending on recent price performance.

[We propose a mechanism that relates asset returns to the firm's optimal listing choice. We use a theoretical model to show that a stock will be more liquid when it is listed on a market where "similar" securities are traded. We empirically examine the implications of our model using New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq securities. We find that the return patterns of stocks that switch markets become more similar to the return patterns of securities listed on the new market prior to the switch. Stocks that are eligible to switch but stay put are more similar to securities listed on their market than to securities listed on the other market. Our results suggest that managers make listing decisions that enhance the liquidity of their firms' stocks]

[This article investigates the information content of signals about the identity of investors and their role in price formation. Whereas we document that investors use multiple brokers, broker identity is nevertheless a powerful signal about the identity of investors who initiate trades. The market also correctly processes this signal: the permanent price impact of orders coming from different brokers fits the information profile of the investors associated with these brokers. Our results suggest that an increase in the degree of anonymity may render order flow less informative, which could explain why the literature has documented liquidity improvements in exchanges that reduce transparency.]

[We use a laboratory market to investigate the behavior of traders who lack informational advantages and have no exogenous reason to trade. We find that these uninformed traders behave largely as irrational contrarian "noise traders," trading against recent price movements to their own detriment. The uninformed traders provide some benefits to the market: increasing market volume and depth, while reducing bid-ask spreads and the temporary price impact of trades. However, their noise trading also diminishes the ability of market prices to adjust to new information. A securities transaction tax reduces uninformed trader activity, but it reduces informed trader activity by approximately the same amount; as a result, the tax does not alter the impact of noise trading on the informational efficiency of the market.]

ABSTRACT We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.

We investigate how and why relative tick sizes influence traders’ order strategies, and how this affects liquidity provision in the market. Using unique NYSE data, we find that a larger relative tick size benefits high-frequency trading (HFT) market makers: they leave orders in the book longer, trade more aggressively, and have higher profit margins. In a tick-constrained (tick-unconstrained) environment, larger relative ticks result in greater (less) depth, which is consistent with greater adverse selection coming from increased undercutting of limit orders by informed HFT market makers. Received October 12, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2018 by Editor Thierry Foucault.

We propose a mechanism that relates asset returns to the firm's optimal listing choice. We use a theoretical model to show that a stock will be more liquid when it is listed on a market where “similar” securities are traded. We empirically examine the implications of our model using New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq securities. We find that the return patterns of stocks that switch markets become more similar to the return patterns of securities listed on the new market prior to the switch. Stocks that are eligible to switch but stay put are more similar to securities listed on their market than to securities listed on the other market. Our results suggest that managers make listing decisions that enhance the liquidity of their firms' stocks.

We examine the dynamic relation between return and volume of individual stocks. Using a simple model in which investors trade to share risk or speculate on private information, we show that returns generated by risk-sharing trades tend to reverse themselves, while returns generated by speculative trades tend to continue themselves. We test this theoretical prediction by analyzing the relation between daily volume and first-order return autocorrelation for individual stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX. We find that the cross-sectional variation in the relation between volume and return autocorrelation is related to the extent of informed trading in a manner consistent with the theoretical prediction.

This article investigates the information content of signals about the identity of investors and their role in price formation. Whereas we document that investors use multiple brokers, broker identity is nevertheless a powerful signal about the identity of investors who initiate trades. The market also correctly processes this signal: the permanent price impact of orders coming from different brokers fits the information profile of the investors associated with these brokers. Our results suggest that an increase in the degree of anonymity may render order flow less informative, which could explain why the literature has documented liquidity improvements in exchanges that reduce transparency.