This paper's results are consistent with the choice of accounting method in the oil and gas industry being dominated by measurable characteristics of firms and guided by the principles of efficient contracting. The results are inconsistent with an alternative hypothesis, opportunistic behavior by managers. The efficient contracting explanation is also consistent with the empirical findings from earlier studies; [e.g., Lilien and Pastena (1982) and Deakin 1979)].

This paper describes the background and objectives of a series of papers written fifty years ago at the London School of Economics (LSE). One objective was to encourage the use of accounting numbers in economic research. A second objective was to improve the theory and practice of accounting. Understanding cost accounting and opportunity costs within a firm was tied to understanding the organization of firms. The theory of the accounting system is part of the theory of the firm. Like a similar request made fifty years ago, the paper concludes with a call for interdisciplinary studies between economics and accounting.

This article presents evidence that turnover is negatively selective on a worker's job performance. At establishments with about seventeen employees, workers who are one standard deviation (21 percent) less productive than average during the first few months on the job are 11 percentage points more likely to be laid off or fired and 7 percentage points more likely to quit during the succeeding year. At large nonunion establishments and in small labor markets, productivity has large effects on involuntary separations, but almost no effect on quits. Productivity appears to be positively related to layoffs and quits at unionized establishments.

This paper shows that the positive effects on decision making of financial incentives, performance feedback, and the requirement to justify one's decisions to others can be undermined or even reversed by the availability of a decision aid. More specifically, in the absence of a decision aid, subjects achieved greater classification accuracy in a repetitive decision task when a monetary incentive was offered, or when feedback about past performance was provided, or when they were required to justify their choices, relative to the absence of these three variables. In contrast, when a statistically valid decision aid was available, the same incentive, feedback, and justification requirements resulted in lower classification accuracy, again relative to the absence of these three variables. These results are interpreted within a framework having two basic tenets. First, financial incentives, performance feedback, and a justifi-

A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myerson's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is a “cost plus” type of transfer pricing. Specializing the general model to allow risk‐neutral agents, we derive the exact form of the compensation schemes in dominant strategy equilibrium transfer pricing mechanism. The general Myerson agency problem is transformed into a central planner's problem enabling us to bypass the first‐order approach to the problem. The closed form solution shows that each of the agents' compensation schemes is composed of a profit‐sharing component, a cost refund, taxes, and subsidies, making it a Groves‐like scheme. Additional results show that if the principal is asymmetrically informed about one of the agents only, the agent may derive rent from private information under monotonic compensation schemes, and we provide additional conditions under which Hirshleifer's classical marginal cost pricing is in equilibrium. Résumé. Les auteurs élaborent une théorie d'affectation des ressources internes au sein de l'entreprise, en situation d'asymétrie de l'information, à partir de la théorie générale des mécanismes de Myerson. En se fondant sur le modèle général, les auteurs démontrent que chaque mécanisme d'affectation des ressources correspondant à l'équilibre de Myerson tient du prix de cession interne de type « prix coûtant majoré ». En spécialisant le modèle général de façon à permettre l'introduction de mandataires neutres à l'égard du risque, ils dérivent la forme exacte de régimes de rémunération correspondant au mécanisme de détermination du prix de cession en situation d'équilibre de la stratégie dominante. Le problème mandant‐mandataire général de Myerson se transforme en problème de planificateur central, ce qui permet de court‐circuiter le premier ordre d'analyse du problème. La solution de nature fermée révèle que tout régime de rémunération des mandataires est composé d'un élément de participation aux bénéfices, de remboursement de frais, de taxes et de subventions, ce qui l'apparente à celui de Groves. D'autres résultats indiquent que si le mandant obtient de l'information asymétrique de l'un des mandataires seulement, ce dernier peut tirer, dans le cadre de regimes de remuneration monotoniques, un loyer de l'information privilégiée qu'il communique. Les auteurs ajoutent des conditions supplémentaires selon lesquelles l'établissement du prix selon la méthode classique de Hirshleifer en fonction des coûts marginaux est en équilibre.

There is much variation in the union/nonunion wage gap across groups of workers within each of the two sectors, public and private. Furthermore, the variation in the public sector does not parallel in all of its detail that in the private sector. Thus, though the public-sector gaps typically are somewhat below their private-sector counterparts, there are important exceptions to this difference, especially among employees of local governments: public school teachers, clerical workers, refuse collectors, local transit bus drivers, licensed practical nurses, hospital technicians, nonprofessional hospital workers, and undoubtedly some others.

Auctions allocate resources to their highest-valued uses. Yet bankruptcy does not use auctions. Instead judges determine a value and parcel out interests on the assumption that this valuation is correct. Errors inevitable in this process lead many persons to conclude that bankruptcy is inefficient. This essay argues that the conclusion does not follow. The costs of error in valuation may be less than the cost of conducting an auction. Legal rules endure because they are efficient or because they transfer wealth. Transfers are an implausible explanation of the current bankruptcy regime, leaving efficiency as the prevailing explanation.

In this paper we study a two‐person firm consisting of a principal and an agent. The principal hires the agent to provide some input into the production process. The output of the production process is determined by the agent's input and an exogenous state realization. Subsequent to joining the firm, but prior to choosing his input, the agent privately observes the state realization. The principal employs an imperfect monitoring system that publicly reports on the state realization. Our purpose in studying this model is to better understand the effects of monitoring on the design of the optimal employment contract and the determinants of the value of monitoring in a model with asymmetric information. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient une entreprise constituée de deux personnes, un mandant et un mandataire. Le mandant embauche le mandataire pour sa contribution au processus de fabrication. Le résultat du processus de fabrication est déterminé par la contribution du mandataire et par la réalisation d'un état exogène. Après s'être joint à l'entreprise, mais avant de déterminer quelle sera sa contribution, le mandataire observe, en privé, la réalisation de cet état exogène. Le mandant a recours à un système de suivi imparfait qui fait le point, à l'intention du public, sur la réalisation de l'état en question. L'étude de ce modèle permet une meilleure compréhension des conséquences du suivi sur la nature de contrat d'emploi optimal et des déterminants de la valeur du suivi dans un modèle caractérisé par une information asymétrique.

A model incorporating SSI participation, information and perceptions of program eligibility is developed and estimated using data from the 1980 PSID. The model assumes the participation decision process begins in an uninformed regime and switches to an informed regime if the perceived benefits are sufficiently high. In this informed regime individuals participate if perceived benefits exceed perceived costs. We find that the acquisition of information is responsive to actual program generosity just as is participation itself. Faulty information, which may be the proximate cause of low participation rates, is apparently, in part, a consequence of low perceived net benefits.