It is generally accepted that banks offer renegotiation services to sovereign borrowers facing short-term liquidity shortages. However, the literature has yet to find evidence of such services from the pricing of sovereign bank loans. The research on the pricing of sovereign bank loans has focused on interest spreads alone, while the pricing structure typically includes an up-front fee, as well. In this paper, I explore empirically the economic motivations for such a pricing structure. I find that up-front fees are explained by the probability of renegotiation and by proxies for informational problems. My findings provide evidence that the unique pricing structure of bank loans helps banks provide sovereign borrowers with renegotiation services.

Firms with greater shareholder rights have a greater risk-shifting incentive, requiring more lender monitoring. Thus, a reduction in shareholder rights implies more diffused (less monitoring-intensive) loan syndicates. Using the passage of U.S. second-generation antitakeover laws as an exogenous shock that reduces shareholder rights as a natural experiment, we find that loan syndicates become significantly more diffuse after the passage of these laws. These results are confirmed in a large sample of bank loans made during the 1990–2007 period when the loan syndicate market matured. Our results show how corporate governance causally affects financial contracting and creditor control in firms.

We examine the effect of relationship lending on a firm’s cash-holding levels. Relationship lending allows lenders to generate private information about borrowers, which mitigates their financial constraints. Using exogenous shocks to identify stress to lending relationships, we show that strong lending relationships translate into lower cash holding for borrowers. We also show that the impact of lending relationships on cash holdings is greatest for firms faced with high information asymmetry. Thus, opaque firms are more likely to use their borrowing relationship as a substitute for cash holdings. We find that relationships have a negative impact on the market value through a firms’ level of cash holding. This impact is significantly greater when firms experience a large change in their cash holdings.

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1435 events during the 1996–2013 period in which an activist targeted a US corporation, to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We present two new results. First, we show that when a firm is targeted by an activist hedge fund, the lenders of that firm charge a significantly higher rate on future loans and demand collateral more frequently than the loans made to risk- and industry-matched non-targeted firms. Second, we find that this increase in loan rate and the likelihood of collateral demand is limited only to those targets that experience a large positive announcement return when the news of an activist's involvement is first announced. We argue that higher interest rates and greater collateral requirements reflect the increased credit risk for these borrowers due, in part, to the possibility of wealth expropriation by the shareholders. Thus, we provide empirical evidence that an increase in equity value due to an activist's targeting may partially be due to wealth expropriation from creditors.