While the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) mandates board risk committees for large banks, we argue that such committees do not benefit all banks. Banks forced by the DFA to adopt a board risk committee do not experience a reduction in risk following adoption. In contrast, banks that voluntarily established risk committees before the DFA exhibit lower risk, especially when these committees possess greater risk expertise. Using unique interview data, we find that board risk committees serve as active monitors rather than merely rubber-stamping management proposals. However, regulatory-mandated tasks limit their monitoring role.

The nominating committee (NC) of the board identifies and nominates individuals for board service, thus establishing the board's composition. Despite this important role, relatively little is known about the NC process, including NC members' actions and thought processes. Based on interviews of 20 U.S. public company NC members, including 16 chairs, we focus on two primary questions: (1) what is the extent of influence that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has over committee processes, and (2) to what extent are committee processes formalized (i.e., framed and acted upon in a mechanistic way)? We find that there is continuing recognition of CEO influence in the director nomination process, the level of which varies widely by company. Also, there is considerable variability in the formalization of the director nomination process (e.g., some NCs use search firms and a matrix/grid approach to assessing director skill sets across the board, while others do not). Finally, we find that many interviewees have professional or personal ties to the CEO and that nearly all of the NCs focus on “chemistry” and comfort in the director nomination process, where the often‐stated goal is to enhance the board's ability to function effectively and to reduce risk in the director nomination process. The overall message of the interviews perhaps is best captured by one interviewee, who described a “strange little dance.” Throughout the interviews, we find evidence that the NC must “dance” through a complex decision landscape.

A fundamental unresolved issue is whether information asymmetries underlie investors' predisposition to invest close to home (i.e., domestically or locally). We conduct experiments in the United States and Canada to investigate agents' portfolio allocation decisions, controlling for the availability of information. Providing participants with information about a firm's home base, without disclosing its specific identity, is not sufficient to change investment behavior. Rather, participants need to know a firm's name and home base. Additional evidence indicates that participants have a greater perceived familiarity with local and domestic securities and, in turn, invest more in such securities.

Based on interviews of U.S. public company compensation committee members, this study examines the compensation committee process, the specific action and thought processes that compensation committee members use to meet their oversight responsibilities. As the two quotes above suggest, compensation committee members who are asked to describe the process their committee uses often mention notions of “fairness” and “balance” in compensation. The first quote describes a fundamental tension between management and shareholders, and the committee’s efforts to be fair to both parties. The second quote focuses on balancing the interests of management and shareholders, as well as those of other stakeholders, and suggests the difficulty of making executive compensation decisions.