Why are some firms listed and other firms private? and why do some countries, therefore, have relatively more listed firms than other countries? In this paper, we argue that different industries have different propensities to list on stock exchanges making the industrial structure of the country a major determinant of the size of the stock exchange and the proportion of listed firms. The questions are analyzed using individual firm data on the likelihood of European firms being listed or private. In addition, we show that the likelihood of listing is greater in countries where banks are allowed to engage in investment banking. Finally, after controlling for industrial structure and financial sector characteristics, we show that firms are more likely to list under the Scandinavian legal system than in common law or civil law countries.

By placing a ceiling on the amount of possible depositor loss, deposit insurance should result in a lower deposit risk premium. However, this effect may be modified if either the insurance promise has low credibility or the moral hazard incentives generated by deposit insurance result in a greater probability of bank default. Using financial and institutional panel data from thirteen countries, we find that the risk premium is over 40 basis points higher on average in uninsured countries than in countries that offer insurance up to some pre-specified maximum. However, the risk premium has a non-linear relationship with the level of maximum insurance coverage, suggesting that the market recognizes the moral hazard potential. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on the risk premium is weaker in countries with strong creditor rights, consistent with the view that investors view the latter as a substitute for explicit deposit insurance.