This paper documents that the dynamics of occupational segregation are highly nonlinear and exhibit tipping patterns. Occupations experience discontinuous declines in net male employment growth at tipping points ranging from 25% to 45% (from 13% to 30%) female in white-collar (blue-collar) occupations from 1940 to 1990. These patterns appear consistent with a Schelling (1971) social interaction model where tipping results from male preferences toward the fraction female in their occupation. Supporting the model’s predictions, evidence from the General Social Survey indicates that tipping points are lower in regions where males hold more sexist attitudes toward the appropriate role of women.

We provide evidence that constraints that prevent highly skilled women from working long hours hinder gender pay equality. We show that relaxing one such constraint by increasing the supply of substitutes for household production—proxied by intercity variation in predicted low-skilled immigration—increases the relative earnings of women in occupations that disproportionately reward overwork. Low-skilled immigration inflows induce young women to enter occupations with higher returns to overwork and shift women toward higher quantiles of the male wage distribution. The share of women in the top decile remains unaffected, suggesting that other barriers prevent women from reaching the very top.

We explore how the availability of affordable live-in help provided by foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in Hong Kong affected native women’s labor supply and welfare. First, we exploit differences in the FDW program between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Second, we use cross-sectional variation in the cost of a FDW to estimate a model of labor force participation and FDW hire. FDWs increased the participation of mothers with a young child (relative to older children) by 10–14 percentage points and have generated a monthly consumer surplus of US130–US200. By reducing child care costs through immigration, this is a market-based alternative to child care subsidies.

The past five decades have seen a remarkable convergence in the economic roles of men and women in society. Yet, persistently large gender gaps in terms of labor supply, earnings, and representation in top jobs remain. Moreover, in countries like the United States, convergence in labor market outcomes appears to have slowed in recent decades. In this article, we focus on the role of children and show that many potential explanations for the remaining gender disparities in labor market outcomes are related to the fact that children impose significantly larger penalties on the career trajectories of women relative to men. We document that, in the United States, more than two-thirds of the overall gender earnings gap can be accounted for by the differential impacts of children on women and men. We propose a simple model of household decision-making to motivate the link between children and gender gaps in the labor market, and to help rationalize how various factors potentially interact with parenthood to produce differential outcomes by gender. We discuss several forces that might make the road to gender equity even more challenging for modern cohorts of parents, and offer a critical discussion of public policies that seek to address the remaining gaps. (JEL D13, J12, J13, J16, J22, J31, J71)

This paper examines the relationship between the prevalence of overwork and skilled women's labor force participation and occupational choice. Using country-level variation, we find a negative relationship between the share of males working 50+ hours a week and the LFP of young married women, with the correlation being much smaller for single women and older married women. Using a panel of occupations across countries, we find that overwork in an occupation is negatively correlated with the share of married women working in that occupation. This finding is robust to controlling for the occupational distribution of groups with fewer household responsibilities.

In most of the developed world, skilled women marry at a lower rate than less skilled ones. We document heterogeneity across countries in how the marriage gap between skilled and unskilled women has evolved over time. As labour market opportunities for women have improved, the marriage gap has been growing in some countries but shrinking in others. We discuss the comparative statics of a theoretical model in which the (negative) social attitudes toward working women might contribute to the relatively lower marriage rate of skilled women and might also induce a non-monotonic relationship between their labour market prospects and their marriage outcomes. The model delivers predictions about how the skilled–unskilled marriage gap should react to changes in labour market opportunities across economies with more or less conservative attitudes toward working women. We verify the key predictions of this model in a panel of 26 developed countries, as well as in a panel of U.S. states.

We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We show that the distribution of the share of income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop to the right of 12 , where the wife’s income exceeds the husband’s income. We argue that this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms, which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband. We present evidence that this aversion also impacts marriage formation, the wife’s labor force participation, the wife’s income conditional on working, marriage satisfaction, likelihood of divorce, and the division of home production. Within marriage markets, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, marriage rates decline. In couples where the wife’s potential income is likely to exceed the husband’s, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work. In couples where the wife earns more than the husband, the wife spends more time on household chores; moreover, those couples are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce. These patterns hold both cross-sectionally and within couples over time.

It is well established that consumption is “hump” shaped over an individual's lifecycle, peaking in middle age and then declining in the years that follow. Prior research has documented that consumption declines at retirement, which is inconsistent with the standard lifecycle model with consumption smoothing. Using a unique dataset with detailed administrative records of credit and debit card transactions, we show the hump shaped lifecycle consumption pattern as documented in the literature. Additionally, we show compositional changes in consumption expenditures across individuals in the years surrounding retirement confirming the results of Aguiar and Hurst (2005, 2013).

We study how peer beliefs shape individual attitudes toward maternal labor supply using hypothetical scenarios that elicit recommendations on the labor supply choices of a mother with a young child and an information treatment embedded within geographically representative surveys of the US population. Across scenarios, we find that individuals are systematically misinformed about the extent of gender conservativeness of the people around them. Exposure to information on peer beliefs leads to a shift in recommendations, driven largely by information-based belief updating. The information treatment also increases (intended and actual) donations to a non-profit organization advocating for women in the workplace.