In this paper, the authors examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid-ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, the authors provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.

[The relation between theorized components of the bid-ask spread and trade size for a sample of NYSE firms is examined. We find that the adverse selection component increases uniformly with trade size. Conversely, order processing costs decrease with increases in trade size for all but the largest trades. We find that order persistence decreases with trade size. The adverse selection component is highest at the beginning of the day and lowest at the end of the day for all but the largest trades. Trades of NYSE firms executed on regional exchanges or NASDAQ contain a large order processing cost component but no significant adverse information effect.]

Ji-Chai Lin, Michael S. Rozeff, Price Adjustment Delays and Arbitrage Costs: Evidence from the Behavior of Convertible Preferred Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 61-80

We provide empirical evidence on the economic benefits of negotiating trades in the upstairs trading room of brokerage firms relative to the downstairs market. Using Helsinki Stock Exchange data, we find that upstairs trades tend to have lower information content and lower price impacts than downstairs trades. This is consistent with the hypotheses that the upstairs market is better at pricing uninformed liquidity trades and that upstairs brokers can give better prices to their customers if they know the unexpressed demands of other customers. We find that these economic benefits depend on price discovery occurring in the downstairs market.

We extend the market timing literature to show that SEO timing can be characterized by the dynamics of liquidity risk. That is, firms tend to issue SEOs when liquidity risk declines to the point where investors have least concern of the risk. In the absence of liquidity risk, market risk rises right before SEOs and then gradually falls afterwards, consistent with the Q-theory (Carlson et al., 2010). However, once we include liquidity risk factor into the model for expected returns, issuing firms' market risk behaves like that of matched non-issuers, suggesting an omitted risk factor problem in SEO studies that does not take into account the effect of liquidity risk on stock returns. Furthermore, there is no evidence of post-issue long-run underperformance. Our results imply that, instead of timing alpha (i.e., exploiting overpricing, as behavioral finance has suggested), issuing firms time liquidity beta to minimize their cost of equity capital. The liquidity beta timing is especially evident in large offer size issuers.

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.

We examine stock price behavior in response to initial coverage, buy recommendations that are pre-released to important clients before the stock market opens, and find a strong positive valuation effect at the open. On average, it takes five minutes of trading for NYSE/AMEX stocks and 15 minutes for NASDAQ stocks to reflect the private information contained in these analyst recommendations, so when informational asymmetry is high, the centralized call market is more efficient than a competitive, but fragmented dealer market. Public news release leaves share prices unaltered. Overall, competition among informed traders causes private information to be rapidly incorporated into stock prices.

The relation between theorized components of the bid-ask spread and trade size for a sample of NYSE firms is examined. We find that the adverse selection component increases uniformly with trade size. Conversely, order processing costs decrease with increases in trade size for all but the largest trades. We find that order persistence decreases with trade size. The adverse selection component is highest at the beginning of the day and lowest at the end of the day for all but the largest trades. Trades of NYSE firms executed on regional exchanges or NASDAQ contain a large order processing cost component but no significant adverse information effect.

This study uses a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model to examine interdependencies among institutional investors, big individual investors, and small individual investors, and the effects of their trading on stock returns on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). The results imply that, during the sample period, big individual investors are the most well informed players; their trading affects not only stock returns but also small individual investors. Small individual investors are not well informed and are slow learners. Their orders to trade tend to provide liquidity to institutional and big individual investors, but there is no compensation for their liquidity services. We find that institutional investors follow neither positive-feedback nor negative-feedback trading strategies. Overall, the responses to shocks, except for those of small individual investors, decay quickly, indicating that the TSE can absorb shocks quickly and efficiently. Our analysis implies that small individual investors would be better off institutionalizing their investment decisions (e.g., by investing in mutual funds).

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) raises firms' incentives to lobby policymakers to access policy information and influence policy outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that non-lobbying firms are less likely to initiate lobbying during periods of heightened EPU. The evidence is consistent with our time-varying barriers hypothesis that entry barriers to lobbying increase with EPU. We verify that the negative effect of EPU on lobbying initiation arises through the channels of lobbying entry expenses and returns to experience. Furthermore, lobbying entry expenses are not large, implying that the returns to experience channel is likely a more serious barrier preventing non-lobbying firms from initiating lobbying. We also find that facing high lobbying entry barriers, non-lobbying firms go for alternative political activities, such as hiring politically connected directors.