We investigate the impact of directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) on stock price crash risk. We find that D&O insurance in China is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative sample, Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, fixed effects model, the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables, and bootstrap method. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on crash risk is more pronounced in firms with lower board independence, non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional shareholdings, and weaker investor protection; and the negative relationship between D&O insurance and crash risk is not driven by the eyeball effect. Moreover, we find that D&O insurance purchase is associated with less financial restatements and more disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports. Our findings provide support to the notion that D&O insurance appears to improve corporate governance.

This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Wiley.

Identifying firms’ bond-market-specific economic links through credit-rating comovement of their corporate bonds, a long-short strategy for stocks based on these links generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 0.45% per month, which cannot be explained by existing economic links in the literature. Market segmentation between the equity and bond markets appears to be the underlying mechanism: (i) The cross-return predictability is muted in the bond market; (ii) The cross-return predictability is mitigated in the presence of cross-holding investors; (iii) Equity analysts slowly incorporate information from rating-comovement links to their forecasts.