This paper proposes a simple decomposition of the widely used DRC measure of international competitiveness into three distinct elements: (1) changes in international prices, (2) changes in production techniques and (3) total factor productivity change. The decomposition provides a clear analytical link between two largely separate methodologies for assessing economic performance, cost-benefit indicators based on the world price rule and total factor productivity analysis. The methodology is applied to evaluate changes in measured comparative advantage of industries in Thailand for the period 1963-76. The results broadly indicate that changes in price competitiveness and in total factor productivity are the major sources of changes in DRC ratios for Thai industries.

Reviews the computer software "Kermit: A File-Transfer Protocol, 1985 Version," from Columbia University Center for Computing Activities.

Reviews the book "Alcar Software: The Value Planner," edited by Harvey S. Hendrickson.

THE X-inefficiency costs of protection and industrial concentration have been topics of considerable interest in the literature on economic development. Balassa (1975) and Bergsman (1974), for example, have argued that protection, by increasing X-inefficiency, generates a major welfare cost which is not captured by traditional costs of protection calculations, and White (1976) has examined the relationship between inappropriate factor intensities which he associates with Xinefficiency and industrial concentration. The common theme which emerges from each of these studies is that public policy can have a major impact on economic performance not only by influencing factor proportions, but also by influencing the intensity with which a non-measurable input, X-efficiency, is employed. Despite the intuitive appeal of the X-efficiency concept there have been very few empirical tests of this hypothesis. This partly reflects the imprecise nature of the basic concept but also the lack of adequate micro economic data. X-efficiency clearly relates to efficiency within firms so that the most appropriate tests would rely on data on firm-level efficiency. In this paper we propose a direct test of the X-efficiency hypothesis using firm-level data. We build on previous work by Corden (1970, 1974) and Martin (1978) who showed how to model X-efficiency effects using the concept of managerial leisure. We extend these simple models of managerial behavior, emphasizing the role of the external managerial labor market. The model is then used to explore the relationship between changes in public policy, managerial effort and X-inefficiency. Certain predictions of the model are tested using cross-section data from a survey of firms in two subsidized industries in Ghana. Efficiency indices are computed on the basis of a translog frontier production function. Variations in relative efficiency are then correlated with several explanatory variables including the presence or absence of subsidy payments to the firm. Subsidized firms in both industries are found to exhibit higher relative levels of X-inefficiency.

Reviews the book "Management Control Systems," by Robert N. Anthony and John Dearden.

The authors investigate the importance of bid-ask spread-induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. They document significant negative return biases on the offering day, which explain a large portion of the negative event date returns documented in the literature. Buy-sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.

This paper assesses the ability of financial statement variables to forecast sensitivities to systematic risk factors generated by a multifactor, macroeconomic forces model. Forecasts of beta derived from financial variables are shown to outperform naive, random walk forecasts, although Bayesian-adjusted betas perform as well as the financial variables model.

ABSTRACT We investigate the importance of bid‐ask spread‐induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. We document significant negative return biases on the offering day which explain a large portion of the negative event date return documented in the literature. Buy‐sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.

We investigate the importance of bid-ask spread-induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. We document significant negative return biases on the offering day which explain a large portion of the negative event date return documented in the literature. Buy-sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.

ABSTRACT Insurance pricing is subject to stricter regulation in some states than others. This cross-sectional variation, coupled with the occurrence of staggered deregulation in several states, enables a powerful test of the political cost hypothesis that managers manipulate accruals to mitigate adverse effects of rate regulation. We show that insurers understate their loss reserve accruals in more regulated regimes, a finding that contrasts with most prior studies documenting expense-increasing accruals in regulatory pricing settings like utilities. We theorize and find evidence that regulator-enabled cartel-like collective rate making leads to premiums being higher than the competitive level. Our results are consistent with accounting manipulation being used to justify deviating from these high rates and showcase a role for accounting in cartel enforcement. JEL Classifications: M41; G18; G22; G32.