We examine the relation between firm diversification and asymmetric information empirically using metrics drawn from the market microstructure literature. We find that the average diversified firm in our sample has somewhat less severe asymmetric information problems than a similarly constructed portfolio of stand-alone firms chosen to approximate the segments of the conglomerate. We also find that the information asymmetry of diversified firms is very similar to that of individual focused firms that approximate the conglomerates along several dimensions not including industry composition. We conclude that greater diversification is not on average associated with increased asymmetric information.

We develop a multi-period learning model to examine the relation between analysts’ forecasting behavior and their performance. In a competitive market for banking services, the surplus and the analyst's payoff, which is determined through bargaining, are convex in her reputation. The convexity of her payoff structure and the presence of employment risk lead to a U-shaped relation between the analyst's forecast boldness and prior performance and a positive relation between forecast boldness and experience. We find support for these predictions in our empirical analysis. Significant underperformers (outperformers) face higher (lower) employment risk and are more likely to issue bolder forecasts.

Jonathan Clarke, Craig Dunbar, Kathleen M. Kahle, Long-Run Performance and Insider Trading in Completed and Canceled Seasoned Equity Offerings, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 415-430

During periods of high IPO underpricing, unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks issue fewer strong-buy recommendations while unaffiliated all-star analysts from low reputation banks do not change their level of optimism. In contrast, unaffiliated non-star analysts from both high and low reputation banks issue more strong-buy recommendations. Consistent with the results on analyst optimism, the market reacts more favorably to strong-buy recommendations by unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks than other unaffiliated analysts during high IPO underpricing periods. Finally, we find that unaffiliated non-star analysts from low reputation banks reduce their coverage following an SEO if they are not selected as a part of the managing syndicate. Collectively, our results indicate that during periods of high IPO underpricing unaffiliated analysts face conflicts of interest, but personal-level reputation, and to a lesser extent bank-level reputation, plays a role in reducing this bias.

Between 2009 and 2013, the Fly on the Wall (FLY) leaked 58% of recommendation revisions with a median delay of 27 minutes relative to the IBES announcement time. We show that FLY improves price discovery, but leaked recommendations hamper brokers’ ability to offer price improvement on trades routed through them. Three major brokers sued FLY; using key court dates, we show significant wealth and real effects to the brokerage industry. Overall, the speed with which analyst recommendations are disseminated has led to more rapid price discovery at the expense of a decline in the scope of the sell-side research industry.

We use India's unique regulatory design to test sentiment-based models of IPO initial returns. Using a sample of 362 Indian offerings from 2003 to 2014, we find that the traditional measure of IPO underpricing averages 23%. We decompose the traditional underpricing measure into two components: one related to voluntary underpricing by the underwriter and the other component related to the IPO's first-day trading activity. We find minimal levels of voluntary underpricing. However, initial returns on the first day average 14% and are primarily driven by the unmet demand of non-institutional investor groups. Overall, our results support sentiment-based models of IPO initial returns.

This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996–2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms.

Abstract We test whether a bias exists in analyst recommendations for firms that file for bankruptcy during 1995–2001. We fail to find overoptimism in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts. Our multivariate analysis of the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations indicates that prior affiliation exerts no impact on either returns or trading volume. We find that the market does not view recommendation upgrades by affiliated analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following these recommendation changes. Overall, our results suggest that recently passed legislation to reduce analysts' conflicts of interest might be an overreaction.

ABSTRACT We demonstrate that time stamps reported in I/B/E/S for analysts’ recommendations released during trading hours are systematically delayed. Using newswire‐reported time stamps, we find 30‐minute returns of 1.83% (−2.10%) for upgrades (downgrades), but for this subset of recommendations we find corresponding returns of −0.07% (−0.09%) using I/B/E/S‐reported time stamps. We also examine the information content of recommendations relative to management guidance and earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that analysts’ recommendations are the most important information disclosure channel examined.