Josh Lerner of Harvard University and NBER reviews “Patenting Life: Tales from the Front Lines of Intellectual Property and the New Biology” by Jorge Goldstein. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the legal, commercial, and social debates surrounding the patenting of biological materials, whether living single cells, whole plants or animals, or the inert molecules that they produce or from which they are made.”

This article examines the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of private firms in their portfolios. If venture capitalists are intensive monitors of managers, their involvement as directors should be more intense when the need for oversight is greater. The authors shows that venture capitalists' representation on the board increases around the time of chief executive officer turnover, while the number of other outsiders remains constant. He also shows that distance to the firm is an important determinant of the board membership of venture capitalists, as might be anticipated if the oversight of local firms is less costly than more distant businesses.

[How do individuals decide to become entrepreneurs and learn to make optimal entrepreneurial decisions? The concentration of entrepreneurs in regions such as Silicon Valley has stimulated research and policy interest into the influence of peers, but the causal effect is hard to identify empirically. We exploit the exogenous assignment of students into business-school sections to identify the causal effect of entrepreneurial peers. We show that, in contrast to prior findings, a higher share of entrepreneurial peers decreases, rather than increases, entrepreneurship. The decrease is driven by a reduction in unsuccessful entrepreneurial ventures; the effect on successful ventures is significantly more positive.]

Venture capital distributions, a legal form of insider trading, provides an ideal arena for examining the share price impact of transactions by informed parties. These sales, which occur after substantial run-ups in share value, generate a substantial price reaction immediately around the event. In the months after distribution, returns apparently continue to be negative. When the short- and long-run reactions are decomposed, they are consistent with the view that venture capitalists use inside information to time stock distributions: Distributions of firms brought public by lower quality underwriters and of less seasoned firms have more negative price reactions.

The origins of financial innovations have attracted little empirical scrutiny. Using Wall Street Journal articles as an indicator, this paper examines which institutions were the key financial innovators between 1990 and 2002. The evidence suggests that smaller firms account for a disproportionate share of the innovations. Less profitable firms innovate more, though in the years subsequent to the introduction of the innovation, the profitability of the innovators increases significantly. Finally, older, less leveraged firms located in regions with more financial innovations innovate more. While several of the determinants of patenting are similar, small and unprofitable firms do not patent disproportionately.

[Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.]

This paper empirically examines the 'long purse' hypothesis, formalized by Patrick Bolton and David Scharfstein (1990), that incumbents may drive out entrants through aggressive pricing. The author analyzes the pricing of 733 disk drives between 1980 and 1988. Drives that are adjacent to those manufactured by thinly capitalized undiversified rivals are priced lower than other drives during the later years in the sample, when little equity financing was available to these firms. The results are robust to controls for alternative hypotheses and to other specifications of the hedonic regression. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms' incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs.

This article documents the fact that ventures funded by two successful angel groups experience superior outcomes to rejected ventures: They have improved survival, exits, employment, patenting, Web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in angel-funding behavior over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effects for venture operations, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of successful exits. On the other hand, there is no difference in access to additional financing around the discontinuity. This might suggest that financing is not a central input of angel groups.

Economists have long seen the patent system as a crucial lever through which policymakers affect the speed and nature of innovation in the economy. It is not surprising, then, that the profound changes which have roiled the global patent system over the past 20 years are attracting increasing attention from the economics profession. A critical question relates to the impact of these shifts: to what extent do they really affect the pace of innovative discovery and diffusion? Much of the theoretical economics literature, such as Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro [1990], has assumed an unambiguous relationship between the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation. This assumption has been relaxed in a line of work on sequential innovation, beginning with Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green [1990]. This research addresses this question by examining the impact of major patent policy shifts in sixty nations over the past 150 years. I examine the changes in patent applications by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change. While I tabulate domestic filings by residents and non-residents alike, confounding factors may influence