Auditing, Nondiagnostic evidence, Seemingly Irrelevant evidence, Audit judgment

[We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2), justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.]

Abstract. We examine the empirical relationship between auditors' resource allocations and selected engagement characteristics. Our measure of resources is hours of grades of labor (partner, manager, etc.) “charged” to audit activities (planning, internal control evaluation, etc.). Engagement characteristics examined are client size, industry affiliation, client complexity, risk, auditor provision of management advisory services to the auditee, and degree of control reliance. The data were obtained from publicly available sources and a survey developed and administered by an international public accounting firm. We find the cross‐sectional variation in the labor charged to various audit activities can be explained by engagement characteristics found to be important in prior studies on audit fees, total labor inputs, and the mix of labor inputs. Measures of client size, industry, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with changes in the allocation of labor among audit activities. We find no substitution of internal control review/testing for substantive testing on reliance audits. Task assignments vary by rank. Measures of client size, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with activity‐specific changes in the labor mix.

Abstract Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8‐K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8‐K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement‐related or fee‐related reasons and higher for those that switched for service‐related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns‐earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8‐K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes.

Our interest in this study is the relative informativeness of earnings announcements reported before and after Form 8-K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change. We appeal to several models that predict that the market's response to an earnings surprise is positively related to the perceived precision of the earnings report. We predict that the Form 8-K reason disclosures aid investors in updating their expectations of earnings precision by providing useful information about the financial reporting process that produces the earnings report. For 802 auditor changes from late 1991 through late 1997, the average price response per unit of earnings surprise is lower subsequent to an auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement-related or fee-related reasons and higher for those that switched for service-related reasons. This paper provides further evidence on the effects of differential earnings quality on differences in the returns-earnings relation across companies and over time as well as the efficacy of Form 8-K disclosures of reasons for auditor changes.

[This paper investigates whether replacing a standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold with a standard that employs a more stringent, numerical threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions. Two experiments were performed in a tax setting. The results indicate that (1) when a verbal standard is in place, tax practitioners use the latitude inherent in a verbal standard to support aggressive reporting decisions, and (2) when a numerical standard is in place, tax practitioners use instead the latitude available in assessing evidential support to justify an aggressive reporting decision. This shift in incentive effect is pronounced enough to render reporting decisions made under the numerical standard as aggressive as reporting decisions made under the verbal standard. These results indicate that replacing verbal thresholds with numerical thresholds may not diminish the aggressiveness of reporting decisions.]

Abstract We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2) justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.

Abstract. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5 requires accrual of contingent losses which are deemed probable. This disclosure criterion is intended to be applied uniformly across a variety of contexts. We performed an experiment which examined whether audit managers' interpretations of the SFAS No. 5 probability expressions are influenced by one contextual feature, event base rate. Counter to the intention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), interpretations of the expression probable were positively associated with event base rate. Résumé. Le SFAS n o 5 exige l'imputation à l'exercice des pertes éventuelles qui sont jugées «probables». La règle ainsi établie veut que ce critère de présentation d'information soit appliqué uniformément dans des contextes très divers. Les auteurs procèdent à une expérience dans le cadre de laquelle ils examinent si la façon dont les responsables de mission interprètent la gamme de probabilités, au sens du SFAS n o 5, est influencée par une caractéristique contextuelle, la fréquence relative de l'événement. Contrairement au résultat visé par le FASB, les interprétations du terme «probable» sont en relation positive avec la fréquence relative de l'événement.

Auditing, Competition, Audit quality, Auditor performance

Abstract Investigates whether replacing a standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold with a standard that employs a more stringent numerical threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions in accounting. Performance in a tax setting; Effect of incentives on the interpretation of vague standards.