We provide an explanation of why convertibles are called long after the conversion value exceeds the call price. Delaying the call benefits the firm if enough investors are expected to delay their voluntary conversions. Consistent with this theory, we document that a substantial number of investors do not voluntarily convert when the common dividend exceeds the convertible's dividend plus its premium over conversion value. We find that firms would not have increased common stock returns by switching to the strategy of calling to force conversion as soon as possible. Surprisingly, we find that convertible preferreds frequently sell below conversion value.

The term structure relations implied by a model in which preferences are non-separable functions of the service flows from two goods are investigated. The parameters characterizing preferences are estimated and restrictions on the co-movements of consumptions and Treasury bill returns are examined. Both the durability of goods and the non-separability of preferences are important factors in explaining the time paths of individual returns, but there is substantial evidence against the cross-sectional restrictions implied by our model. Differences between sample mean returns are too large relative to the sample covariances of the return differences and the marginal utility of consumption.

Unlike most securities, the pricing of sinking fund bonds is influenced by the distribution of ownership, which summarizes the extent to which the market is cornered. The effect of the distribution of ownership on the pricing of sinking fund bonds is examined by an explicit game in which the price obtained for bonds sold can depend upon the size of the investor's position. This framework is used to contrast the valuation of sinking fund bonds with the valuation of amortizing bonds and straight debt. We show that it is generally incorrect to view sinking fund bonds as being equivalent to serial bonds.

We analyze the impact of a contract's length, callability, amortization, and original discount by arbitrage methods. Among instruments that are callable without penalty, longer instruments command a higher interest rate because the borrower possesses the option of repaying relatively more slowly. However, the rate on longer self‐amortizing loans cannot be substantially larger than for shorter ones because the payments decrease with contract length. Bounds on the trade‐off between points and rate for callable debt are characterized using the trade‐off for noncallable debt and the property that the value of the prepayment option increases with the loan's interest rate.

ABSTRACT We analyze the impact of a contract's length, callability, amortization, and original discount by arbitrage methods. Among instruments that are callable without penalty, longer instruments command a higher interest rate because the borrower possesses the option of repaying relatively more slowly. However, the rate on longer self‐amortizing loans cannot be substantially larger than for shorter ones because the payments decrease with contract length. Bounds on the trade‐off between points and rate for callable debt are characterized using the trade‐off for noncallable debt and the property that the value of the prepayment option increases with the loan's interest rate.

ABSTRACT The due‐on‐sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan. We analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low. In that case, the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments. We also demonstrate, by a risk‐sharing argument, that the due‐on‐sale clause is optimal in some settings, even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales.

Kenneth B. Dunn, Kenneth J. Singleton, An Empirical Analysis of the Pricing of Mortgage-Backed Securities, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings Forty-First Annual Meeting American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December 28-30, 1982 (May, 1983), pp. 613-623

This article reexamines the value of tax trading when the tax rate on long-term realizations is less than that on short-term realizations. In particular, the value of the option to realize long-term capital gains and repurchase stock in order to increase one’s tax basis and restart the option to realize future losses short term is examined empirically. Our estimate of the incremental value of restarting, which is based on the results of simulations of several alternative tax trading policies over a large number of independent return sequences, is generally much smaller than that reported by Constantinides (1984). The incremental value of restarting is shown to depend critically on the particular pattern of realized returns and the assumed tax treatment of unrealized capital gains at the end of the simulation period. The effects of stock price volatility, transaction costs, portfolio offset rules, and realization cutoff levels on the value of tax trading are also investigated.

[This article reexamines the value of tax trading when the tax rate on long-term realizations is less than that on short-term realizations. In particular, the value of the option to realize long-term capital gains and repurchase stock in order to increase one's tax basis and restart the option to realize future losses short term is examined empirically. Our estimate of the incremental value of restarting, which is based on the results of simulations of several alternative tax trading policies over a large number of independent return sequences, is generally much smaller than that reported by Constantinides (1984). The incremental value of restarting is shown to depend critically on the particular pattern of realized returns and the assumed tax treatment of unrealized capital gains at the end of the simulation period. The effects of stock price volatility, transaction costs, portfolio offset rules, and realization cutoff levels on the value of tax trading are also investigated.]