De nombreuses sociétés qui utilisent de multiples indicateurs avancés de rendement ne valident pas le modèle causal qui relie ces indicateurs aux résultats financiers futurs, et les relations de cause à effet du modèle sont souvent abandonnées aux estimations subjectives qui peuvent être sujettes à l’erreur. En procédant à une expérience, l’auteure examine comment l’exactitude des hypothèses au sujet de la pondération des indicateurs avancés dans un modèle causal influe sur le rendement et les connaissances des gestionnaires, lorsque lesdits gestionnaires se voient offrir la possibilité d’apprendre au fil de plusieurs périodes. Les résultats obtenus montrent que le fait que des coefficients de pondération inexacts soient affectés aux indicateurs avancés améliore le rendement, réduit la fluctuation du rendement et enrichit les connaissances, comparativement à l’absence de coefficients de pondération. En outre, le rendement est semblable, peu importe que les coefficients de pondération soient exacts ou inexacts, alors que les connaissances sont meilleures lorsque les coefficients de pondération sont inexacts que lorsqu’ils sont exacts, ce qui ne confirme en rien les effets de polarisation des coefficients de pondération inexacts. Les observations résultant de l’étude semblent indiquer qu’à tout le moins dans certaines circonstances, les gestionnaires tirent avantage des coefficients de pondération affectés aux indicateurs avancés, même lorsqu’ils sont inexacts, et sont en mesure de corriger ces inexactitudes pour parvenir à un niveau comparable de rendement et de connaissances, comme s’ils avaient disposé de coefficients de pondération exacts.

Many firms that use multiple lead measures in their performance measurement systems do not validate the causal model linking these measures to future financial outcomes, and the cause‐and‐effect relationships in the model are often left to subjective estimates that may be prone to errors. Using an experiment, this study examines how the accuracy of assumptions about the relative importance of lead measures in a causal model affects managerial performance and knowledge, when managers are given the opportunity to learn over multiple periods. The results show that having inaccurate relative weights on lead measures improves performance, reduces performance variability, and enhances knowledge, relative to not having any weights. Furthermore, performance is similar under accurate versus inaccurate relative weights, whereas knowledge is better under inaccurate than accurate relative weights, providing no support for the biasing effects of inaccurate relative weights. The findings suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, managers benefit even if they are given inaccurate relative weights on lead measures, and they are able to correct those inaccuracies to reach a comparable level of performance and knowledge as if they had been given accurate relative weights.

This paper examines how adding leading non-financial value drivers to a lagging summary financial measure affects managerial decision making in firms where either intangible assets (intangible assets firm) or tangible assets (tangible assets firm) are more important for future financial performance. Using an experiment, I compare a control performance evaluation system (PES) with feedback and incentives on only a summary financial measure to a PES with added feedback on non-financial measures and a PES with added feedback and incentives on non-financial measures. I find that managers increase their decision quality more in the intangible assets firm than in the tangible assets firm when both feedback and incentives on non-financial measures are added, but not when only feedback on non-financial measures is added. Early in the experiment, managers of the intangible assets firm do not make better decisions with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures, but do so with the further adding of incentives on non-financial measures. However, managers of the intangible assets firm improve their decisions over time with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures. On the other hand, managers of the tangible assets firm do not make better decisions with the adding of only feedback on non-financial measures nor with the further adding of incentives on non-financial measures. The results suggest that the benefits of adding non-financial value drivers may vary based on a firm's dependency on tangible versus intangible assets, and on whether the non-financial value drivers are explicitly rewarded in the incentive contract.

Companies increasingly disclose human capital initiatives, such as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and non-DEI initiatives. Yet, DEI initiatives have become a focal point of debate, raising questions about whether investors view them as appropriate uses of company resources. Across two experiments, we examine how nonprofessional investors perceive DEI versus non-DEI initiatives. Drawing on equity theory, we propose that investors' fairness-based perceptions of an initiative's appropriateness depend on their underlying preferences for what companies should prioritize, and that these perceptions influence their investment willingness. Experiment 1 finds that investors perceive DEI (versus non-DEI) initiatives as less appropriate, and this difference is exacerbated when investors are more shareholder-oriented than stakeholder-oriented. Furthermore, the mediating effect of perceived appropriateness on investment willingness is stronger when company financial performance is unfavorable than when it is favorable. Building on these findings, Experiment 2 tests a boundary condition of our theory by examining whether explicitly stating merit-based selection criteria attenuates shareholder-oriented investors' stronger negative perceptions of DEI initiatives. We find that when DEI initiatives are explicitly presented as merit-based, investors' negative perceptions of appropriateness of DEI (versus non-DEI) initiatives are attenuated, and the exacerbating moderating effect of shareholder (versus stakeholder) investor orientation also diminishes. Our findings demonstrate how investors' fairness-based perceptions of appropriateness can explain divergent responses to DEI disclosures, offering timely implications for companies and regulators concerned with human capital reporting.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how the interaction of perceived subjectivity and pay transparency in profit allocation is associated with an important aspect of law partners' professional judgment, namely their tendency to accede to the wishes of their client and fellow partner (labeled hereafter as partner accedence). Based on interviews with 56 corporate law partners working in large Canadian law firms, we find higher partner accedence in a less subjective system than in a more subjective system, but only under no pay transparency. We find that pay transparency (versus no transparency) is associated with increased accedence in a more subjective system, but it is marginally associated with decreased accedence in a less subjective system. In an experiment where we randomly assign MTurk participants to conditions, we replicate the finding that pay transparency (versus no transparency) has a more positive effect on partner accedence as subjectivity level increases. Data Availability: Lawyers participated in the study upon which this paper is based only after signing agreements that strict confidentiality of all data would be maintained by the researchers. As such, we are bound by these confidentiality agreements with individual lawyers interviewed for the study. Experiment data from Amazon Mechanical Turk are available from the authors. JEL Classifications: M12; M40; M52.

Our study examines whether implementing a novel approach for incentivizing employees to engage in behavior desired by the company is associated with changes in employee behavior. We use proprietary data from a company using an online learning platform where employees could voluntarily participate in daily training. Employees who complete daily training modules and correctly answer quiz questions earn points that can be used to bid on gift cards through an online auction site. The company subsequently activated an option of allowing employees to also use their points to play an online slot machine with the possibility of winning the same gift cards available through the online auction site. Using psychology theory we predict that the arousal and excitement experienced from playing an online slot machine will lead to a positive association between the extent to which employees play the slot machine and the increase in: (1) the number of daily training modules they complete; and (2) the effort they exert to perform well on the related quizzes after the slot machine was introduced. Although the results support both of our predictions, we also find a significant decrease in the number of daily training modules completed by employees who chose not to play the slot machine as well as declines in both interest in playing the slot machine and training activity over time for employees who played. Overall, the effectiveness of implementing an online slot machine game on improving employee behavior seems short-term and limited to a sub-set employees who play, and may even generate negative effects for other employees who do not play. We identify implications for theory and practice.