Calls for greater transparency in PCAOB inspections have intensified amid persistent concerns about opacity and inconsistency. We integrate prior academic research with in-depth interviews from 29 former PCAOB inspectors to construct a detailed, phase-based account of the inspection process over global network firms. We organize insights into four sequential phases—hiring, training, and performance assessment; planning; execution; and resolution—and present structured taxonomies that combine the literature with novel, practice-based observations. The paper’s primary contribution lies in organizing fragmented research and insider perspectives into a framework that clarifies how inspections operate in practice and where further research is critical. This synthesis provides a structured foundation for researchers, practitioners, and regulators seeking to evaluate and strengthen audit oversight—at a time when the structure and independence of the PCAOB itself faces renewed political scrutiny.

ABSTRACT Regulators are concerned about the quality of group audits because of poor inspection results, recent enforcement actions against component auditors, and the significance of these audits to the global economy. Yet research in this area is nascent. In response, we survey and interview US‐based global group audit leads to better understand the group audit process and their perceptions of challenges that arise on such engagements. Our findings indicate that group auditors organize their audits consistent with the client's structure, which drives component auditor selection, scoping, and fees. Group auditors routinely find fault with component auditors, perceiving that work performed and/or documentation provided is not sufficient, not appropriate and/or not communicated timely, to comply with US standards and reporting deadlines. In some cases, they perceive that the component auditor is unable and/or unwilling to comply and in others, that the component auditor misunderstands group instructions due to language proficiency or differing interpretation of the standards. Notably this perspective is ethnocentric, as group auditors almost exclusively attribute issues to component auditors. While ethnocentric tendencies appear myopic, they provide insight into unrecognized or overlooked aspects of the global firm model of cooperative arrangements. This study highlights the significance of the global firm's network structure to global group audits. Thus, we encourage intercommunity research, among (quantitative and qualitative) scholars and standard setters, to consider group audits in the broader context of firm networks.

ABSTRACT The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.

ABSTRACT This study aims to understand international rotations (“secondments”) as a brokerage mechanism within globally networked public accounting firms (GNFs). Through interviews with 29 secondees on tour to or from the U.S. (individuals on rotation from one member firm to another member firm in a specified role for a fixed period) and 11 firm leaders, we find that secondments are viewed as a critical brokerage function in performing global client service and global risk management. Specifically, secondees bridge gaps in the GNF structure by brokering network ties, technical knowledge, sociocultural knowledge, and language. Secondees embody different brokerage roles and can fulfill more than one brokerage role at a time, depending on the purpose of the secondment and the stage of deployment. Collectively, secondments are important mechanisms by which structural holes are reduced between participating member firms and proximal member firms, ultimately benefiting the global firm and the global clients they serve.

We investigate how auditors learn the technical aspects of their professional role while performing client engagements, and how that learning process has been shaped by changes in societal, economic, and regulatory forces. Prior studies explicitly recognize that auditors need social skills and demeanor consistent with professional norms as well as requisite knowledge, but those studies generally focus on the processes through which new auditors are molded toward consistency with social norms. In contrast, we focus on forces affecting the transfer of technical knowledge from supervisor (guide) to subordinate (learner) in the everyday work setting. Our evidence derives from semi‐structured interviews with 30 relatively new and more experienced audit partners at one Big 4 firm, thus spanning multiple “generations” of experience. Results confirm that auditors primarily acquire technical knowledge on the job, through the interactions among individual engagement team members. However, partners express concern about changes in the practice environment that may limit effectiveness of on‐the‐job learning, including characteristics of personnel, the approach to formal training at induction, supervisors' reluctance to provide candid feedback, regulatory and economic pressures, and the increased distraction, and reduced interpersonal contact associated with the use of information technology. At the end of the day, our findings raise implications for practice regarding the difficulty of developing effective learning conditions for auditors in the face of these challenges.