Both theoretical and experimental research has shown that full disclosure of private information will be observed when disclosures are credible. Disclosures are generally considered to be credible when they either are subject to an antifraud rule, are ex post verifiable, or are both. However, little consideration has been given to the individual and interactive effects of these conditions. This paper presents arguments concerning the effects of antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on disclosures of private information and the reaction to those disclosures. It predicts an equilibrium of full disclosure only when an antifraud rule is in effect, independent of the presence or absence of ex post verification. Further, one adverse selection problem is posited to disappear after repeated observations, regardless of antifraud rules or ex post verifiability. These assertions are tested by 20 laboratory experiments, which, in addition, provide insight into the effect of a legal system on disclosures. The results generally support the analytical assertions. Résumé. Les recherches théoriques aussi bien qu'expérimentales ont démontré que la présentation intégrale de l'information à caractère privé est observée lorsque les renseignements fournis sont crédibles. Ces renseignements sont généralement jugés crédibles lorsqu'ils sont assujettis à une règle anti‐fraude, lorsqu'ils peuvent être verifiés ex post ou lorsqu'ils présentent ces deux caractéristiques. Jusqu'à maintenant, cependant, on s'est peu intéressé aux conséquences particulières et interactives de ces caractéristiques. Les auteurs présentent ici leur argumentation au sujet des conséquences des règles anti‐fraude et de la vérifiabilité ex post sur la présentation d'information privée et sur la réaction à la présentation de cette information. Selon eux, l'équilibre de présentation intégrale de l'information n'est atteint que dans le cas où s'applique une règle anti‐fraude, indédependamment de l'existence d'une vérification ex post. Plus encore, ils concluent à la disparition d'un problème de sélection préjudiciable après des observations répétées, peu importe les règles anti‐fraude ou la vérifiabilité ex post. La véracité de ces affirmations est mise à l'épreuve dans le cadre de 20 expériences en laboratoire qui livrent en outre certaines indications relatives à l'incidence d'un système juridique sur la présentation d'information. Les résultats viennent généralement appuyer les hypothèses d'analyse.

This article investigates why, in October 1987, almost all stock markets fell together despite widely differing economic circumstances. We construct a model in which “contagion” between markets occurs as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other markets. This provides a channel through which a “mistake” in one market can be transmitted to other markets. We offer supporting evidence for contagion effects using two different sources of data.

[This article investigates why, in October 1987, almost all stock markets fell together despite widely differing economic circumstances. We construct a model in which "contagion" between markets occurs as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other markets. This provides a channel through which a "mistake" in one market can be transmitted to other markets. We offer supporting evidence for contagion effects using two different sources of data.]

This paper studies four classic fiscal-policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model. The authors' main findings are as follows: (1) permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short-run and long-run output multipliers that exceed one; (2) permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes; (3) the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases; and (4) public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment. These findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy.

Why do the countries of the world display considerable disparity in long-term growth rates? This paper examines the hypothesis that the answer lies in differences in national public policies that affect the incentives that individuals have to accumulate capital in both its physical and human forms. Our analysis shows that these incentive effects can induce large differences in long-run growth rates. Since many of the key tax rates are difficult to measure, our procedure is an indirect one. We work within a calibrated, two-sector endogenous growth model, which has its origins in the microeconomic literature on human capital formation. We show that national taxation can substantially affect long-run growth rates. In particular, for small open economies with substantial capital mobility, national taxation can readily lead to "development traps" (in which countries stagnate or regress) or to "growth miracles" (in which countries shift from little growth to rapid expansion). This influence of taxation on the rate of economic growth has important welfare implications: in basic endogenous growth models, the welfare cost of a 10 percent increase in the rate of income tax can be 40 times larger than in the basic neoclassical model.

Why do the countries of the world display considerable disparity in long-term growth rates? This paper examines the hypothesis that the answer lies in differences in national public policies that affect the incentives that individuals have to accumulate capital in both its physical and human forms. Our analysis shows that these incentive effects can induce large differences in long-run growth rates. Since many of the key tax rates are difficult to measure, our procedure is an indirect one. We work within a calibrated, two-sector endogenous growth model, which has its origins in the microeconomic literature on human capital formation. We show that national taxation can substantially affect long-run growth rates. In particular, for small open economies with substantial capital mobility, national taxation can readily lead to "development traps" (in which countries stagnate or regress) or to "growth miracles" (in which countries shift from little growth to rapid expansion). This influence of taxation on the rate of economic growth has important welfare implications: in basic endogenous growth models, the welfare cost of a 10 percent increase in the rate of income tax can be 40 times larger than in the basic neoclassical model.