Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preceding announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously reported accounting book values. Reported common stock returns associated with alleged misrepresentations in financial statements are consistent with incentives provided by the law. Classification of misrepresentations based on hypothesized relations between announcements and security returns results in observed differences in the association between litigated accounting announcements and common stock returns.

This paper examines the use of alternative information sets in the construction of inflation hedge portfolios. The study is motivated by consideration of the investor's problem in a multiperiod world. Several authors (e.g., Merton [1973] and Breeden [1979]) have shown that in a multiperiod setting, optimal investment behavior will, in general, involve holding portfolios that can be used to hedge against changes in certain relevant states of nature. One potentially relevant state of nature is the rate of inflation in general prices (Jones [1982] and Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler [1983]). In contrast to prior related research, the empirical results indicate that it is possible to construct inflation hedge portfolios successfully, if certain accounting information is used. However, portfolios constructed on the basis of historical security price information do not serve as effective hedges. One contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the potential usefulness of accounting information to a price-taking investor. Although financial statements play an important role in the setting of equilibrium

In this paper, a general treatment of identifying the set of unbiased estimators of N-period mean returns is advanced and a new unbiased estimator, which promises near-minimum variance and minimal computation, is formulated. The new estimator is also equally applicable to other processes of compound growth.

Robert L. Hagerman, Mark E. Zmijewski, Pravin Shah, The Association between the Magnitude of Quarterly Earnings Forecast Errors and Risk-Adjusted Stock Returns, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 526-540

Properties are derived for the profit-maximizing price schedule in a market where the firm can observe the size of any given purchase, but cannot directly observe the number of purchases made by any given consumer. In such a market, A consumer may make multiple purchases to minimize the amount paid for a given quantity of the good. It is shown that when purchase numbers are unobservable the schedule may entail quantity premia and may be strikingly different from the schedule that obtains when the numbers of purchases are observable. In particular, some individuals may consume more under the profit-maximizing outcome than under the first-best outcome.

Abstract Reviews the book "Handbook of Modern Accounting," by Sidney Davidson and Roman Weil.

Abstract Reviews the book "Objectives and Basic Concepts of Accounting," by A.D. Barton.

Aside from possible income effects, measures of the maximum amounts people will pay to avoid a loss and the minimum compensation necessary for them to accept it are generally assumed to be equivalent. Unexpectedly wide variations between these sums, however, have been noted in survey responses to hypothetical options. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments that confronted people with actual money payments and cash compensations. The results indicate that the compensation measure of value seems to exceed significantly the willingness to pay measure, which would appear to call into some question various rules of entitlement, damage assessments, and interpretations of indifference curves.

We consider a model oflabor union behavior in which workers make decisions about wages and employment by simple majority rule. We show that under general conditions such a union has a well-behaved objective function, different from those previously postulated in the literature. We then show that the union's majority preferences generally lack a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation and thus cannot be inserted into traditional bargaining models. We then develop and characterize the solutions to a new bargaining model that is consistent with the structure of union preferences. Several comparative-statics results are presented.