The challenge of leadership is to look beyond the current expansion to consider the long–term outlook for the U. S. economy. My good friend Paul W. McCracken once described this process as looking across the valley to see what is on the other side. His message was: “What will be different on the other side of the valley is far more relevant to business planning than the valley itself.” Such advice is particularly meaningful at this time because of the basic need for more stability in our economic policies.

F. R. MACAULAY' and other writers2 have noted a tendency for changes in the square roots of common-stock prices to be constant regardless of price level. This phenomenon has naturally suggested that when such prices are represented graphically the charts be designed so that vertical distances from the origin are proportional to the square roots of the prices indicated in the margins. There is some reason to believe that charts of this kind might also be useful in plotting other kinds of data. Assume that n sales are distributed at random over 1/p firms during some interval of time, and that u1, u2, *, u1/, are the actual numbers of sales made by the different firms F1, F2, , Fil, Then, a priori, the probability that a particular firm will make one of these sales is p, and the mean and variance of the u's will tend to be

Early in 1940, Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins showed Franklin Roosevelt a brief outline of fiscal policies for defense as seen by economists on his staff. The first step was prompt expansion to the level of full by means of federal deficits. Then, once full employment is attained, the task of fiscal policy is twofold: (1) to maintain full employment; (2) to secure as rapidly as possible that orientation of production which our defense demands. Leon Henderson, Richard V. Gilbert, and other liberal Keynesian advisers were proceeding with the 1930's agenda of recovery. They viewed expenditures for national defense, together with exports of military goods, as

This paper reconciles the relative pricing controversy between DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Chan (1988), and Ball and Kothari (1989). The negative autocorrelation in long-horizon index returns, along with the selection criterion of the contrarian strategy, can explain the positive covariance between time-varying betas and risk premiums. However, test-period beta estimates reflect the reversal of earnings expectations associated with underlying factors. The controversy thus reduces to the debate of Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) over the source of the temporary price components in the market index. Rational changes in expected returns and cash flows explain most of the cross-sectional variation in returns.

We model the risk of setting the required fixed-offer price in an IPO given initial uncertainty about value, as well as costs of over and underpricing. Assuming that the goal of issuers in bookbuilt IPOs is to maximize net offering proceeds, our analysis indicates that their optimal strategy is to negotiate a relatively small spread, consistent with material underpricing. Similarly, considering the expected costs of overpricing makes the underpricing of best-efforts IPOs in the interest of issuers. Our results rely on neither asymmetric information nor agency costs and provide support for Hansen's (2001) nearly-optimal “conventional” spread and the view that it evolved from adaptive, imitative behavior, consistent with Alchian's (1950) explanation of how economic players evolve practices to survive under uncertainty and incomplete information, as well as Alchian's (1969) work on how fixed prices and queues can efficiently clear product markets.

We show how bias can arise systematically in the beta estimates of extreme performers when long-run return reversals are present and partly, or wholly, due to sign changes in unanticipated factor realizations. Our evidence is consistent with this bias being responsible for the large shifts in the beta estimates of extreme performers, more so than the leverage effect, which has been the predominant explanation in prior literature. Bias in these contemporaneous realized betas, estimated with the same returns that are to be risk adjusted, arises due to the general problem of “overconditioning,” where betas are estimated conditional on information that is not yet known. Several methods for conditioning betas on out-of-sample returns are evaluated and found to be lacking, although some offer improvement under certain circumstances. We also show evidence of this bias in the Fama–French Three-factor loadings of extreme performers. Our findings indicate not only that previous studies of long-run reversals understate contrarian profits but that bias is prevalent in the OLS beta estimates of extreme performers, and this has implications for estimating the cost of capital and measuring long-run performance. We offer recommendations for identifying when this bias is likely present, as well as general methods to correct for it.

The authors examine the returns of stocks in the Cowles Industrial Index before and after the introduction of personal income taxes in 1917. This is distinct from earlier studies because they cross-sectionally analyze the relationship between the returns of the individual stocks and measures of tax-loss selling potential and size. The authors find that excess returns at the turn-of-the-year and for the month of January were not significant until after 1917. These results provide strong support for the tax-loss selling hypothesis as an explanation for the January seasonal in the returns of small firms.

Abstract We investigate whether attitudes toward gambling help explain the occurrence of intentional misreporting. Similar to gambling, some financial reporting choices involve taking deliberate, speculative risks. We predict that in places where gambling is more socially acceptable, managers will be more likely to take financial reporting risks that increase the likelihood the financial statements will need to be restated. To test this prediction, we exploit geographic variation in local gambling attitudes and find that restatements due to intentional misreporting are more common in areas where gambling is more socially acceptable. This association is even stronger in situations where management is under greater pressure to misreport, including when the firm is close to meeting a performance benchmark, experiencing poor financial performance, or under investment‐related pressure. Furthermore, these results are robust to numerous tests to address omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these findings suggest gambling attitudes help explain the incidence of intentional misreporting.