Abstract This article presents a reply to a comment on the study of the audit staff assignment in accounting in the U.S. There are no actual implementations of linear programming in audit staff scheduling. There are lamentably few implementations of linear programming or other quantitative decision models. There is a report of an application of linear or goal programming to audit staff scheduling or other problem. As accounting professionals the responsibility to encourage applications of the proposed models is the priority.

Abstract This paper discusses the assignment of audit staff personnel to audit engagements to conform to the limitations of an audit office and at the same time meet the unique professional and economic objectives of that office. A linear programming model of this assignment problem is being discusses which not only provides an assignment that maximizes a linear function describing the audit office's professional and economic objectives, but provides other useful information for decisions such as scheduling of professional development and education, etc. The proposed model has a significant potential limitation--the benefit--maximizing nature of linear programming. Auditors do not seek to maximize profits or billings but rather to serve the public as well as possible and earn a satisfactory compensation. Hence, the model cannot simply maximize office billings. The steps which have been taken to construct a useful measure of audit office benefits for maximization overcomes this limitation, and will be described in the paper.

Abstract The article represents a study of one effect on issuers of financial statements in the airline industry which the use of alternative reporting practices has had. A discussion of the results of the study briefly considers the consequences of being able to observe this effect for organized public accounting practice and authority. Capitalists, in such economy in which both good and bad financial statements circulate, face investment decisions in which the results of selecting given alternatives are known with more or less certainty depending on whether the related financial statements are good or bad. The degree of uncertainty can be affected by the form and content management chooses for the financial statements. The author states that firms with bad financial statements would be penalized because capitalists would require a higher return from their equities than from the equities of firms with good financial statements. Financial statements are surely among the devices available for the firm to minimize its purchase of capitalist ignorance within the meaning of the profit-maximization constraint.

Human resources, Input prices, Financial reporting, Accounting Choices

[This study investigates the relationship between insider trading and fraud. We find that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold. Moreover, we present evidence that a cascaded logit model, incorporating insider trading variables and firm-specific financial characteristics, differentiates companies with fraud from companies without fraud.]

Abstract Reviews the book "Management Forecasts of Earnings: Issues and Practices," by D.H. Drury.

Reviews the book "Studies in the Recovery of Capital," by Shinkichi Minemura.