Exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid-ask spreads. If the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted, spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large. A cross-sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies. The results are used to project $1/16 spread usage frequencies given a $1/16 tick. Projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models. For stocks priced under $10, the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent, quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent, and daily volume would increase 34 percent. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

[Exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid-ask spreads. If the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted, spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large. A cross-sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies. The results are used to project 1/16 spread usage frequencies given a 1/16 tick. Projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models. For stocks priced under $10, the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent, quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent, and daily volume would increase 34 percent.]

This paper develops and implements a technique for estimating a model of the bid/ask spread. The spread is decomposed into two components, one due to asymmetric information and one due to inventory costs, specialist monopoly power, and clearing costs. The model is estimated using NYSE common stock transaction prices in the period 1981–1983. Cross-sectional regression analysis is then used to relate time-series estimated spread components to other stock characteristics. The results cannot reject the hypothesis that significant amounts of NYSE common stock spreads are due to asymmetric information.

Using new econometric methods, we separately estimate average transaction costs for over 167,000 bonds from a 1‐year sample of all U.S. municipal bond trades. Municipal bond transaction costs decrease with trade size and do not depend significantly on trade frequency. Also, municipal bond trades are substantially more expensive than similar‐sized equity trades. We attribute these results to the lack of bond market price transparency. Additional cross‐sectional analyses show that bond trading costs increase with credit risk, instrument complexity, time to maturity, and time since issuance. Investors, and perhaps ultimately issuers, might benefit if issuers issued simpler bonds.

Some mutual funds purchase stocks before dividend payments to artificially increase their dividends, which we call “juicing.” Funds paid more than twice the dividends implied by their holdings in 7.4% of fund-years examined. Juicing is associated with larger inflows, and is more common among funds with unsophisticated investors. This behavior is consistent with an underlying investor demand for dividends, but is hard to explain by taxes or need for income, as funds can generate equivalent tax-free distributions by returning capital. Juicing is costly to investors through higher turnover and increased taxes of 0.57% to 1.52% of fund assets per year.

Using a complete record of U.S. over‐the‐counter (OTC) secondary trades in corporate bonds, we estimate average transaction costs as a function of trade size for each bond that traded more than nine times between January 2003 and January 2005. We find that transaction costs decrease significantly with trade size. Highly rated bonds, recently issued bonds, and bonds close to maturity have lower transaction costs than do other bonds. Costs are lower for bonds with transparent trade prices, and they drop when the TRACE system starts to publicly disseminate their prices. The results suggest that public traders benefit significantly from price transparency.