Reviews the book "Information for Decision Making," edited by Alfred Rappaport.

The paper proposes a self-exciting asset pricing model that takes into account co-jumps between prices and volatility and self-exciting jump clustering. We employ a Bayesian learning approach to implement real-time sequential analysis. We find evidence of self-exciting jump clustering since the 1987 market crash, and its importance becomes more obvious at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. We also find that learning affects the tail behaviors of the return distributions and has important implications for risk management, volatility forecasting, and option pricing.

Abstract We document that leased capital accounts for about 20% of total physical productive assets used by US public firms, and its proportion is more than 40% among small and financially constrained firms. The leased capital ratio exhibits a strong countercyclical pattern over business cycles and a positive correlation with cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty. We argue that existing macro models with financial frictions assume that firms cannot rent capital and overlook the effects of leasing activities on business cycle dynamics. We explicitly introduce a buy-versus-lease decision into the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist financial accelerator model setting to demonstrate a novel and quantitatively important economic mechanism: that the increased use of leased capital when financial constraints become tighter in bad states significantly mitigates the financial accelerator mechanism and thus also mitigates the response of macroeconomic variables to negative total factor productivity shocks and risk shocks. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our mechanism.

ABSTRACT The link between corporate bond credit spreads and secondary market illiquidity in the cross section has grown stronger since 2005, resulting in a higher liquidity component in credit spreads. Using U.S. investor holdings data, we show that short‐term investors (e.g., mutual funds/exchange‐traded funds [ETFs]) increase trading activities in the secondary market, amplifying the effect of secondary market frictions on prices. We provide a model featuring heterogeneous investors with different trading needs and heterogeneous bonds to investigate the impact of the rapid‐growing mutual fund/ETF sector on the corporate bond market. We find the change in investor composition can quantitatively explain the aggregate trend.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high‐pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.

Motivated by psychological evidence on limited investor attention and anchoring, we propose two proxies for the degree to which traders under- and overreact to news, namely, the nearness to the Dow 52-week high and the nearness to the Dow historical high, respectively. We find that nearness to the 52-week high positively predicts future aggregate market returns, while nearness to the historical high negatively predicts future market returns. We further show that our proxies contain information about future market returns that is not captured by traditional macroeconomic variables and that our results are robust across G7 countries. Comprehensive Monte Carlo simulations and comparisons with the NYSE/Amex market cap index confirm the significance of these findings.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.

Over the recent decade or so, the Chinese government implemented a commercial reform that features governmental application of digital technologies to acquire and process firm information. The core objective of commercial reform is to improve information transparency and monitoring on corporate commercial activities. To explore the economic effectiveness of the reform, we examine how it impacts firms' stock price crash risk. We find robust evidence that the commercial reform that digitalizes government regulatory activities mitigates stock price crash risk and achieves so via enhancing information environment and monitoring for firms. This finding is more prominent for firms with higher levels of digitalization and innovation and those with weaker internal governance. Overall, our findings highlight a potential benefit of applying digital technologies to regulatory reform, encouraging governments to adopt digital tools to improve information environments and monitoring for firms, and thereby promoting a more stable and efficient capital market.

Abstract We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

Published in Review of Financial Studies https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu078