We characterize competitive equilibria with perfect foresight in a deterministic, three-period pure-exchange overlapping generations economy with perfect information and no commitment to loan contracts. Commitment is replaced by an enforcement mechanism that excludes defaulters from asset markets for one period. For hump-shaped endowment profiles, young individuals face endogenous debt constraints that ration current consumption. Changes in current and future yields affect these constraints, inducing an additional income effect on rationed household demand that makes current and future consumption complements. This mechanism can lead to multiple steady states, persistent indeterminacy and regime switching. We show that sensitivity to shocks and complex dynamic behaviour are consistent with endogenous debt limits but not with exogenous liquidity constraints.

Using a vector-autoregression (VAR) model and data from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, we provide evidence on the importance of news and consumers’ beliefs for housing-market dynamics and aggregate fluctuations. We document that innovations to News on Business Conditions generate hump-shaped responses in house prices and other macroeconomic variables. We also show that innovations to Expectations of Rising House Prices are particularly important in explaining the path of macroeconomic variables during housing booms. To disentangle the effects of News on Business Conditions from other sources of expectation-driven cycles, we estimate a VAR where the News variable is ordered first. Innovations to News on Business Conditions generate Expectations of Rising House Prices. However, during housing booms, innovations to Expectations of Rising House Prices unrelated to News on Business Conditions account for a large part of macroeconomic fluctuations. Shocks to News and Expectations account together for more than half of the forecast error variance of house prices, and other macroeconomic variables, during periods of booms in house prices.

We consider monetary-fiscal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. With both policies discretionary, (1) Nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities, (2) of the two leadership possibilities, fiscal leadership is generally better. With fiscal discretion, monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Second-best outcomes require either joint commitment, or identical targets for the two authorities—output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative—or complete separation of tasks.

This paper investigates the effect of limited enforcement of contracts on asset returns in a three-period pure- exchange overlapping generations economy. We consider a life-cycle setting with a safe and a risky asset and find that lack of commitment can significantly affect the rate of returns of these assets and possibly generate large equity premia.

We study the impact of higher bank capital requirements on corporate lending spreads using granular bank- and loan-level data. Our empirical strategy employs the heterogeneity in capital requirements across banks and time of implementation in Switzerland. We find that changes in the capital deviation from the regulatory minimum affect lending spreads asymmetrically. In response to a reduction in the capital deviation, banks with deficits with respect to their risk-weighted capital requirement raise spreads relative to banks with surpluses and de-leverage. Banks respond to higher requirements by raising spreads and, for deficit banks, by cutting lending.