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The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts

Review of Economic Studies 1952 20(3), 199
Journal Article The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts Get access James M. Buchanan James M. Buchanan Tallahassee, Florida Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, 1952, Pages 199–208, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295890 Published: 01 January 1952

The Maximisation of Profit by a Newspaper

Review of Economic Studies 1952 20(3), 181
Journal Article The Maximisation of Profit by a Newspaper Get access W. M. Corden W. M. Corden Melbourne, Australia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, 1952, Pages 181–190, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295888 Published: 01 January 1952

Inventory Control in Theory and Practice

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1952 66(4), 502
I. Current emphasis on inventory control, 502. — II. The calculation of economic purchase quantities and reorder points, 503. — III. The interaction of economical purchase quantities and reorder point quantities, 508. — IV. Analysis of inventory control problems for style goods, 513. — V. The relationship between inventory control analysis, businessmen's behavior, and economic theory, 517.

The Theory of Union Wage Policy

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1952 34(1), 34
BY comparison with the voluminous literature on the theories of the firm and consumer, the amount of space devoted to the theory of the union is small indeed. This is not accidental; it results from the fact that the behavior of firms and consumers can be easily interpreted as maximizing while that of a union cannot. In recent years, however, the theory of the union has received increased attention. For example, John T. Dunlop in his now famous volume of essays, Wage Determiinationi Under Trade Unions,' has attempted to apply the maximization principle to labor union behavior, arguing that a union typically, although not universally, attempts to maximize the money income of its membership. The thesis that unions are maximizers has served as a spur to the enunciation of at least one antithesis: Ross's theory that union behavior is determined by considerations.' Ross's view of union behavior is not entirely new, but he has given the most lucid statement of this position of which I am aware. However, his arguments have not convinced Dunlop; in the preface to the new edition of Wage Determination he argues that the importance of the political determinants of wage rates has been exaggerated by Ross and others, and that political factors (although occasionally inmportant) are, on the whole, a relatively minor factor in wage determination.3 The issue is thus joined and a rather large-scale controversy is in the making;4 the present paper is offered as a contribution to this debate. Before embarking upon the discussion proper it nmight be well to define some of the crucial concepts used. When I speak of the political aspect of union behavior, or the political determinants of such behavior, I refer to those aspects of the behavior of individuals acting in behalf of a union ' which are best understood if it is assumed that they are motivated by a concern with the interests of the union qua organization,6 rather than with the interests of its members considered as individuals. It is not alleged that the interests of a unioil organization and those of its members are always or usually in conflict; indeed, the frequent confluence of these objectives has been a source of considerable theoretical difficulty. The individuals who act on behalf of a union -hereafter called union leaders -are alleged by Ross to be best understood as seeking primarily the well-being of the union organization rather than the welfare of its members. The well-being of the union organization, as I see it,7 involves the attitudes and behavior of three groups of people toward the union organization: (i) the members of the union,8 (2) the employers of the union members, and (3) the community at large, especially as its attitude is manifested in the behavior of the government toward the union. It is not seriously denied

"The Measurement of Industrial Concentration": A Reply

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1952 34(4), 343
THIS is a reply to an article of M. A. Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, which appeared in the November I95I issue of this REVIEW. Comments by Edwards, Stocking, George, and Berle appeared in the May I952 issue. This reply will endeavor to avoid duplicating points already made by the other discussants, and therefore should be read in conjunction with their contributions in order to provide a full critique of the Adelman article. Adelman's article is broken down essentially into three sections: Parts I and II discuss conceptual problems of measurement; Part III is concerned with concentration during and immediately following World War II; and Parts IV-VI examine the long-term trend of concentration. This reply will take up each of these three sections in order.

Long Period Determinants of Britian's Terms of Trade, 1880-1913

Review of Economic Studies 1952 20(2), 115
Journal Article Long Period Determinants of Britain's Terms of Trade, 1880–1913 Get access G. M. Meier G. M. Meier Williamstown, Massachusetts Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, 1952, Pages 115–130, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295845 Published: 01 January 1952