This paper presents two models of investment in health which explicitly recognize the random nature of illness and death. The first model examines life-cycle behavior of investment and health capital when the motive for investing in health is to decrease the probability of illness. In the second model the individual invests in health through his choice of occupation. This determines the extent of his exposure to a pollutant, such as asbestos, which increases the probability of death. The model examines how exposure to pollution should vary with age and predicts how workers should respond to information about occupational dangers.

This paper presents two models of investment in health which explicitly recognize the random nature of illness and death. The first model examines life-cycle behavior of investment and health capital when the motive for investing in health is to decrease the probability of illness. In the second model the individual invests in health through his choice of occupation. This determines the extent of his exposure to a pollutant, such as asbestos, which increases the probability of death. The model examines how exposure to pollution should vary with age and predicts how workers should respond to information about occupational dangers.

I. Optimality of competitive markets with increasing marginal extraction costs—a correction and elaboration, 338.—II. Cases where extraction rights or extraction technologies must be traded, 341.—III. Conclusion, 343.