This study experimentally examines how industry specialization affects auditors' inherent risk assessments and their confidence in those risk assessments. Two groups of participants - experienced banking specialist auditors and equally experienced nonbanking auditors - provided inherent risk assessments for a hypothetical banking client for two financial statement accounts. They assessed inherent risk for an industry-specific account (loans receivable) and for a nonindustry-specific account (property and equipment). The results indicate that nonbanking auditors assessed inherent risk significantly higher than industry specialists for all but the valuation assertion for the loans receivable account. However, the difference between the nonbanking auditors' and banking specialists' inherent risk assessments was not as great for the property and equipment account. Further, nonspecialists were less confident about the appropriateness of their inherent risk assessments compared with industry specialists. Potential implications for research and practice are discussed in light of the study's findings.

This study experimentally examines how industry specialization affects auditors' inherent risk assessments and their confidence in those risk assessments. Two groups of participants ‐ experienced banking specialist auditors and equally experienced nonbanking auditors ‐ provided inherent risk assessments for a hypothetical banking client for two financial statement accounts. They assessed inherent risk for an industry‐specific account (loans receivable) and for a nonindustry‐specific account (property and equipment). The results indicate that nonbanking auditors assessed inherent risk significantly higher than industry specialists for all but the valuation assertion for the loans receivable account. However, the difference between the nonbanking auditors' and banking specialists' inherent risk assessments was not as great for the property and equipment account. Further, nonspecialists were less confident about the appropriateness of their inherent risk assessments compared with industry specialists. Potential implications for research and practice are discussed in light of the study's findings.

In this paper, the author obtains and interprets estimates of short- and long-run demand for money in the United King dom in the period 1871-1913 utilizing high-quality data on broad money and its determinants and applying recent econometric techniques. A unique, theoretically consistent long-run function is estimated as well as a short-run dynamic demand function that is formally superio r to a number of previous estimates. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Using annual data spanning two centuries for dollar-sterling and franc-sterling real exchange rates, we find strong evidence of mean-reverting real exchange rate behavior. Using simple, stationary, autoregressive models estimated on prefloat data, we easily outperform nonstationary real exchange rate models in dynamic forecasting exercises over the recent float. Such stationary univariate equations explain 60-80 percent of the in-sample variation in real exchange rates, although the degree of short-run persistence may be high. The econometric estimates imply a half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate of about 6 years for dollar-sterling and a little under 3 years for franc-sterling.

The authors use the comparative behavior of real output growth and inflation behavior of members and nonmembers of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) to analyze the importance of ERM membership on macroeconomic performance. An econometric procedure for identifying temporary and permanent shocks to output is proposed and executed. The results confirm that the ERM has acted as a vehicle for macropolicy coordination between members. The authors also investigate several issues relating to the hypothesis of global economic 'tri-polarity' between the United States, Germany, and Japan. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

Technical analysis involves the prediction of asset price movements from inductive analysis of past movements. We establish a number of stylized facts, including that technical analysis is widespread in the foreign exchange market and that it may be profitable. We then analyze four arguments that have been put forward to explain this: that the market may not be fully rational; that technical analysis may exploit the influence of official interventions; that it may be an efficient form of information processing; and that it may inform on nonfundamental influences. While each may have some validity, the latter is the most plausible. As for the foreign exchange, it is almost as romantic as young love, and quite as resistant to formulae.

Our paper assesses progress made by the profession in understanding whether and how exchange rate intervention works. We review theory and evidence on official intervention, concentrating primarily on work published in the last decade or so. We conclude that, unlike the profession's consensus of the 1980s, official intervention can be effective, especially as a signal of policy intentions and when publicly announced and concerted. We note an apparent empirical puzzle concerning the secrecy of much intervention and suggest another way for intervention to be effective which has received little attention in the literature, namely by remedying a coordination failure in the foreign exchange market.

We evaluate the cross-sectional predictive ability of a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function, or Taylor rule, in both statistical and economic terms. We find that investors require a premium for holding currency portfolios with high implied interest rates while currency portfolios with low implied rates offer negative currency excess returns. Our forward-looking Taylor rule signals are orthogonal to current nominal interest rates and disconnected from carry trade portfolios and other currency investment strategies. The profitability of the Taylor rule portfolio spread is mainly driven by inflation forecasts rather than the output gap and is robust to data snooping and a wide range of robustness checks.