This paper investigates whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality and the valuation implications of accruals. We show that (1) the one-year-ahead persistence of income-increasing accruals is significantly lower when accompanied by abnormal insider selling and greater when accompanied by abnormal insider buying; (2) the accrual mispricing phenomenon observed in previous work (e.g., Sloan 1996) is due to the mispricing of income-increasing accruals; (3) one-year-ahead hedge returns to trading strategies based on the direction of accruals and insider trading significantly exceed those based on accruals alone; and (4) the lower persistence of income-increasing accruals accompanied by abnormal insider selling appears to be at least partly attributable to opportunistic earnings management. Our evidence suggests that market participants and researchers can use managers' contemporaneous trading in ex ante assessing the likelihood that the firms' accruals are of high or low quality, and in assessing the likelihood of earnings management. Our evidence suggesting that insiders trade on their knowledge of factors associated with accrual persistence is also relevant to policymakers charged with regulating insider trading.

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the role that a firm’s internal audit function (IAF) plays in the disclosure of material weaknesses reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. Congress 2002). Using data from 214 firms, we examine the relation between material weakness (MW) disclosures and various IAF attributes and activities. Our results indicate that MW disclosures are negatively associated with the education level of the IAF and the extent to which the IAF incorporates quality assurance techniques into fieldwork, audits activities related to financial reporting, and monitors the remediation of previously identified control problems. The timing of Section 404 work and the nature of follow-up monitoring suggests that these aspects of IAF quality help prevent MWs from occurring. We find that MW disclosures are positively associated with the IAF practice of grading audit engagements and external-internal auditor coordination, suggesting that these activities increase the effectiveness of Section 404 compliance processes.

This study examines two questions: When do firms make greater use of subjectivity in awarding bonuses? What are the effects of subjectivity on employee pay satisfaction and firm performance? We examine these questions using data from a sample of 526 department managers in 250 car dealerships. First, the findings suggest that subjective bonuses are used to complement perceived weaknesses in quantitative performance measures and to provide employees insurance against downside risk in their pay. Specifically, use of subjective bonuses is positively related to: (1) the extent of long-term investments in intangibles; (2) the extent of organizational interdependencies; (3) the extent to which the achievability of the formula bonus target is both difficult and leads to significant consequences if not met; and (4) the presence of an operating loss. Second, we find that the effects of subjective bonuses on pay satisfaction, productivity, and profitability are larger the greater the manager's tenure, consistent with the idea that subjectivity improves incentive contracting when there is greater trust between the subordinate and supervisor