We compile a comprehensive international dividend and capital gains tax data set to study tax-based explanations of corporate payout for a panel of 6,035 firms from 25 countries for the period 1990–2008. We find robust evidence that the tax penalty on dividends versus capital gains corresponds closely with firms’ propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares, and with the amount of dividends and shares repurchased. Our coefficient estimates suggest a smaller tax effect than reported in recent single-country, single-event studies. Instead, our results correspond more closely with historic long-term estimates of the elasticity of dividends.

Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners' tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially.

The paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on employment and productivity. I exploit a dividend tax cut of 10 percentage points for closely held private corporations in Sweden. Using data on all closely held Swedish firms with exact information on employees and their wages, I find that firms with limited internal funds increase productivity and wages relative to firms with sufficient internal funds whose investment decisions are less affected by dividend taxes. My findings indicate that dividend taxes constrain firms in investing efficiently. Lower taxes can result in higher capital and labor input and, thus, in higher productivity.

[This paper develops a rational, liquidity-based model of closed-end funds (CEFs) that provides an economic motivation for the existence of this organizational form: They offer a means for investors to buy illiquid securities, without facing the potential costs associated with direct trading and without the externalities imposed by an open-end fund structure. Our theory predicts the patterns observed in CEF initial public offerings (IPOs) and the observed behavior of the CEF discount, which results from a trade-off between the liquidity benefits of investing in the CEF and the fees charged by the fund's managers. In particular, the model explains why IPOs occur in waves in certain sectors at a time, why funds are issued at a premium to net asset value (NAV), and why they later usually trade at a discount. We also conduct an empirical investigation, which, overall, provides more support for a liquidity-based model than for an alternative sentiment-based explanation.]

This paper examines the role of personal income taxes (PIT) in corporate investment decisions. Since PIT reduce consumption and increase cost of labor, investment decisions can be affected because of the inevitable link of production input factors. Using data on PIT in 27 European countries and three within-country approaches, we find that personal income taxes substantially reduce investment. The magnitude is comparable to the effect of corporate taxes. We also document that the PIT-investment relationship can be explained by increased labor costs and by reduced consumption due to higher PIT.

This paper examines the corporate investment effect of a time limit on the use of net operating losses (NOLs). We predict that when countries limit the use of NOLs to a few years instead of allowing indefinite use, managers of loss-making firms have an incentive to increase investments to utilize NOLs before they expire. Using exogenous shocks to profitability from two earthquakes in Italy and variation in the tax treatment of NOLs over time, we find support for this prediction: when the use of NOLs is time-restricted, firms facing losses increase investment. Moreover, this effect is more significant for firms with shorter investment horizons and those in more profitable industries. We provide external validity for this finding using a large panel of firms from European Union countries exploiting variation in tax regimes. These results indicate that restricting loss offsets can increase investments of loss-making firms.

ABSTRACT We explore whether corporate tax enforcement can affect bank lending. Specifically, we hypothesize that tax enforcement efforts aimed at small and midsized enterprises (SME) can improve their information environments, which in turn could lead to increased bank commercial lending. Exploiting the regional structure employed by the IRS until 1999, we find that the corporate tax return audit probability for SMEs is associated with greater commercial lending growth for regionally focused banks. We find similar evidence when exploiting the IRS reorganization from a regional to federal system in 2000. Further results show that tax enforcement's impact on SME informational environments is at least partially responsible for this association: The impact of tax auditing on bank lending is stronger for banks facing greater informational disadvantages and in areas where SMEs face greater hold‐up problems. Finally, we find that the tax audit rate is positively associated with loan portfolio quality, suggesting that tax enforcement can lead to better loan decisions. Our findings are consistent with the tax authority's mandate having important externalities on bank lending and SME access to capital, suggesting that the benefits to tax enforcement go beyond improving tax collection.

ABSTRACT This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.

We examine how the corporate tax system, through its treatment of loan losses, affects bank financial reporting. Exploiting cross-country and intertemporal variation in income tax rates and loan loss provision deductibility, we find that loan loss provisions are increasing in the tax rate for countries that permit general provision tax deductibility. When general provisions are deductible, a 1 percentage point rate increase leads to a provision increase of 4.9% of the sample average. This effect is driven by the tax system's encouragement of timelier loan loss recognition, suggesting that corporate taxation is an important determinant of bank financial reporting transparency.

Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners’ tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially.Received June 20, 2016; editorial decision January 24, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.