Opening the capital account allows financially constrained firms to raise capital from abroad. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, this increases the relative demand for skilled labor versus unskilled labor, leading to higher wage inequality. Using aggregate data and exploiting variation in the timing of capital account openings across 20 mainly European countries, I find that opening the capital account increases aggregate wage inequality. In order to identify the mechanism, I use sectoral data and exploit variation in external financial dependence and capital-skill complementarity across industries. I find that capital account opening increases sectoral wage inequality, particularly in industries with both high financial needs and strong complementarity.

Opening the capital account allows financially constrained firms to raise capital from abroad. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, this increases the relative demand for skilled labor versus unskilled labor, leading to higher wage inequality. Using aggregate data and exploiting variation in the timing of capital account openings across 20 mainly European countries, I find that opening the capital account increases aggregate wage inequality. In order to identify the mechanism, I use sectoral data and exploit variation in external financial dependence and capital-skill complementarity across industries. I find that capital account opening increases sectoral wage inequality, particularly in industries with both high financial needs and strong complementarity.

Recent reforms across Eastern European countries have given more flexibility and information to parties to engage in secured debt transactions. The menu of assets legally accepted as collateral was enlarged to include movable assets (e.g., machinery and equipment). Generalized difference-in-differences tests show that firms operating more movable assets borrowed more as a result. Those firms also invested more, hired more, and became more efficient and profitable following the changes in the contracting environment. The financial deepening we document triggered important reallocation effects: firms affected by the reforms increased their share of fixed assets and employment in the economy.

ABSTRACT We study the effects of capital account liberalization on firm capital allocation and aggregate productivity in 10 Eastern European countries. Using a large firm‐level data set, we show that capital account liberalization decreases the dispersion in the return to capital across firms, particularly in sectors more dependent on external finance. We provide evidence that capital account liberalization improves capital allocation by allowing financially constrained firms to demand more capital and produce at a more efficient level. Finally, using a model of misallocation we document that capital account liberalization increases aggregate productivity through more efficient capital allocation by 10% to 16%.

Recent reforms across Eastern European countries have given more flexibility and information to parties to engage in secured debt transactions. The menu of assets legally accepted as collateral was enlarged to include movable assets (e.g., machinery and equipment). Generalized difference-in-differences tests show that firms operating more movable assets borrowed more as a result. Those firms also invested more, hired more, and became more efficient and profitable following the changes in the contracting environment. The financial deepening we document triggered important reallocation effects: firms affected by the reforms increased their share of fixed assets and employment in the economy. Received August 15, 2014; accepted October 23, 2015 by Editor David Denis.

This paper uses issuance-level data to study how equity capital inflows that enter emerging market economies affect equity issuance and corporate investment. It shows that foreign inflows are strongly correlated with country-level issuance. The relation especially reflects the behavior of large firms. To identify supply-side shocks, capital inflows into each country are instrumented with exogenous changes in other countries’ attractiveness to foreign investors. Shifts in the supply of foreign capital are important drivers of increased equity inflows. Instrumented contemporaneous and lagged capital inflows lead large firms to raise new equity, which they use to fund investment.

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic halted economic activity worldwide, hurting firms and pushing many of them toward bankruptcy. This paper discusses four central issues that have emerged in the academic and policy debates related to firm financing during the downturn. First, the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic is radically different from past crises, with important consequences for optimal policy responses. Second, it is important to preserve firms’ relationships with key stakeholders (e.g., workers, suppliers, customers, and creditors) to avoid inefficient bankruptcies and long-term detrimental economic effects. Third, firms can benefit from “hibernation,” incurring the minimum bare expenses necessary to withstand the pandemic while using credit to remain alive until the crisis subdues. Fourth, the existing legal and regulatory infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with an exogenous systemic shock like a pandemic. Financial sector policies can help channel credit to firms, but they are hard to implement and entail different trade-offs.

This paper provides micro evidence of labor mobility inside business groups. We show that worker flows between firms in the same group are stronger than with unaffiliated firms. Moreover, the reallocation of top workers between group firms is more sensitive to international shocks. Top workers that move within the group in response to shocks reach higher positions and earn higher wages. We find suggestive evidence that productivity increases when firms receive same-group top workers. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that, in response to changing opportunities, joint ownership eases the redeployment of workers endowed with general management skills.

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia's collateral law reform confirms our findings.