We repeat a survey we did in the waning days of the Soviet Union (Shiller, Boycko and Korobov, AER 1991) comparing attitudes towards free markets between Moscow and New York. Additional survey questions, from Gibson Duch and Tedin (J. Politics 1992) are added to compare attitudes towards democracy. Two comparisons are made: between countries, and through time, to explore the existence of international differences in allegiance to democratic free-market institutions, and the stability of these differences.

Random samples of the Moscow and New York populations were compared in their attitudes toward free markets by administering identical telephone interviews in the two countries in May 1990. Although the Soviet respondents were somewhat less likely to accept exchange of money as a solution to personal problems and although their attitudes toward business were less warm, we found that the Soviet and American respondents were basically similar in some very important dimensions: in their attitudes toward fairness, income inequality, and incentives and in their understanding of the working of markets.

We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as major renovation, a change in suppliers, an increase in hours stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic transformation.

We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as major renovation, a change in suppliers, an increase in hours stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic transformation.

Several Eastern European countries have initiated mass privatization programs to transfer state-owned assets to the general population. We show that the decision to pursue mass privatization and even the specific design of the programs are largely dictated by politics. Nonetheless, politically feasible programs can also be made attractive from an economic standpoint in terms of maximizing value, fostering free and efficient markets, and promoting corporate governance. In general, the design of economic institutions is critically shaped by political factors, although satisfactory economic results can be achieved in spite of political constraints.

Random samples of the Moscow and New York populations were compared in their attitudes towards free markets by administering identical telephone interviews in the two countries in May 1990. Although the Soviet respondents were somewhat less likely to accept exchange of money as a solution to personal problems and although their attitudes toward business were less warm, the authors found that the Soviet and American respondents were basically similar in some very important dimensions: in their attitudes toward fairness, income inequality, and incentives and in their understanding of the working of markets. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.