We explain trends in dowry levels in Bangladesh by drawing attention to an institutional feature of marriage contracts previously ignored in the literature: mehr or traditional Islamic bride-price. We develop a model of marriage contracts in which mehr serves as a barrier to husbands exiting marriage and a component of dowry as an amount that ex ante compensates the groom for the cost of mehr. We investigate how mehr and dowry respond to exogenous changes in the costs of polygamy and divorce, and show that our model gives a different set of predictions than traditional models. We show that major changes in dowry levels took place precisely after the legal changes, corresponding to simultaneous changes in levels of mehr.

Breakthroughs with natural excludability are transferred to industry by top academic scientists (stars) working in or with firms. Movement to firms depends on scientists' quality, moving costs, and reservation wage. Scientists' quality, moving costs, trial frequency, interfering academic offers, and productivity of stars already in firms determine reservation wage. In group‐duration analysis for biotechnology, stars move to firms faster as their quality, human focus, and outside coauthorships increase; local firms and productivity of local stars in firms increase; and top local universities decrease. Stars move to firms full or part time similarly, but significance drops for rarer full‐time moves.

West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farmgate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions, or risk-sharing contracts.