A model of price leadership is used to estimate the welfare losses dueto monopoly in U.S. Manufacturing. Given that the leaders behave independently, an hypothesis confirmed empirically, the deadweight lossis estimated at 0.114 percent of GNP based on a sample of 445 four-digit industries. This estimate lends strong support to Arnold C.Harberger's finding of thirty years ago. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.

A model of price leadership is used to estimate the welfare losses due to monopoly in U.S. manufacturing. Given that the leaders behave independently, an hypothesis confirmed empirically, the deadweight loss is estimated at 0.114 percent of GNP based on a sample of 445 four-digit industries.

This study is concerned with the combination of target price and acreage controls as the two major mechanisms of farm policy. Acreage controls are shown to enhance the efficiency of redistribution under a target price program. More specifically, this study demonstrates that if the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, acreage controls do not enhance the efficiency of target price programs in the process of redistributing income to the farm sector. The study proves that if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs is less than one, then the income redistributional costs are likely to be reduced. Moreover, by using an empirical estimate of the elasticity of substitution and farm data for the time period 1984-88, this study demonstrates that acreage control programs have drastically reduced the deadweight losses associated with income redistribution flowing from target price programs. These results lend strong support to the public choice notion that politicians favor efficient favor efficient redistribution schemes.

This study is concerned with the combination of target price and acreage controls as the two major mechanisms of farm policy. Acreage controls are shown to enhance the efficiency of redistribution under a target price program. More specifically, this study demonstrates that if the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, acreage controls do not enhance the efficiency of target price programs in the process of redistributing income to the farm sector. The study proves that if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs is less than one, then the income redistributional costs are likely to be reduced. Moreover, by using an empirical estimate of the elasticity of substitution and farm data for the time period 1984-88, this study demonstrates that acreage control programs have drastically reduced the deadweight losses associated with income redistribution flowing from target price programs. These results lend strong support to the public choice notion that politicians favor efficient favor efficient redistribution schemes.

This study, which covers a sample of 314 four-digit industries taken from an exhaustive set of 450 four-digit industries, shows that increases in concentration associated with rising productivity occur mainly in low-concentration industries, while decreases in concentration associated with rising productivity occur mainly in high concentration industries. The empirical results of this study indirectly lend support to a plausible hypothesis that a small group of firms makes a big impact on the productivity of an initially unconcentrated industry and thereby concentrates it. Later, the small firms imitate the now big firms, and concentration goes down while productivity keeps rising.

This study, which covers a sample of 314 four-digit industries taken from an exhaustive set of 450 four-digit industries, shows that increases in concentration associated with rising productivity occur mainly in low-concentration industries, while decreases in concentration associated with rising productivity occur mainly in high concentration industries. The empirical results of this study indirectly lend support to a plausible hypothesis that a small group of firms makes a big impact on the productivity of an initially unconcentrated industry and thereby concentrates it. Later, the small firms imitate the now big firms, and concentration goes down while productivity keeps rising.

Most studies of the welfare economics of groundwater have focused mainly on the dichotomy between optimal control of groundwater use and no control at all. This article argues that, under circumstances that generally prevail in semiarid zones, assigning property rights to groundwater and permitting the market to determine the allocation of water use can lead to a second-best solution. An argument is made that if potential users would be allowed to Coase-bargain with incumbent users on the issuance of new groundwater rights, the second-best solution is elevated to a Pareto-optimal solution. This article is also a tale of two states: water law and performance in New Mexico and Arizona.