This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, the author finds that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement-period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.

[We document a pattern in the serial dependence of security returns around nontrading days. The correlation of returns the second day after a weekend or holiday with returns the first day after is unusually low, and in many return series is negative, implying a reversal of price movements. We also document unusually large positive return autocorrelations the last day before and the first day after weekends and holidays. The pattern has existed in equity returns for over 100 years, and also exists in several futures markets, implying that the pattern is robust to alternative market microstructures.]

This paper provides evidence that repurchase tender offer announcements convey favorable information about the level and riskiness of future earnings. We show that analysts revise their forecasts of earnings per share upward following repurchase announcements. Repurchase announcement stock price reactions are positively correlated with revisions in short-term forecasts, but not correlated with revisions in long-term forecasts. Thus, the information is primarily about transitory changes in earnings. We also provide evidence that equity betas decline after repurchases. Our findings indicate that the equity beta decreases are due to decreases in the underlying riskiness of the firm's assets.

Despite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. The authors find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. The authors also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise their sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm‐specific.

This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.

This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute governance mechanisms and that demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external governance mechanisms. Received May 18, 2016; editorial decision November 11, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

Spreads on new and renegotiated corporate loans are significantly higher when the loan originates (or is renegotiated) in the two years surrounding bankruptcy filings by industry rivals. This industry-specific contagion is particularly severe in the middle of industry bankruptcy waves. Furthermore, this contagion in loan spreads is mitigated in concentrated industries, consistent with the hypothesis and evidence in Lang and Stulz (1992) that bankruptcy filings in concentrated industries can have positive consequences for rivals (increased market share and/or power). There is also some evidence that contagion affects non-spread terms in loan contracts.

We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.