ABSTRACT This study examines how managers' use of expectation management is affected by their labor market mobility, which we measure by the enforceability of noncompete provisions in their employment contracts. Exploiting quasinatural experiments, our difference‐in‐differences analyses provide new causal insights to the growing literature on how managers' career concerns affect their disclosure choices. Consistent with a less mobile labor market imposing more pressure on managers to achieve earnings expectations, we predict and find that managers in US states that tightened enforcement of noncompete provisions are more likely to manage analyst expectations downward. We also find that downward expectation management is used to a greater extent than other tools such as real and accrual‐based earnings management. Additional analysis shows that the increase in expectation management is more pronounced for CEOs with lower general skills or shorter tenures, for firms with more independent boards, and for industries that are more homogeneous. Our path analysis suggests a significant link between increased use of expectation management after tightened noncompete enforcement and meeting and beating earnings expectations, which in turn is linked to lower executive turnover. Overall, our findings suggest that expectation management is an important channel through which noncompete enforcement reduces executive labor market mobility. Our study sheds light on the underlying mechanism through which labor market mobility affects disclosure choices and has important implications for both firms and regulators on the use and enforcement of noncompete provisions.

ABSTRACT Theory suggests that the provision of voluntary disclosure, in itself, is informative to investors, but prior empirical research largely focuses on investors' reaction to the content of disclosure. We extend the literature on earnings guidance by experimentally examining how investors react to a firm's historical pattern of guidance provision, holding constant guidance content. We manipulate two dimensions of guidance provision—how often guidance is provided (frequency), and whether guidance is provided for the same quarter(s) across consecutive years (pattern consistency). We find that consistency positively impacts investors' confidence and likelihood of investing because investors associate consistency with lesser managerial opportunism, but consistency matters only when frequency is low. Our results shed light on an important dimension of guidance provision unexamined in prior research—guidance consistency—and highlight when it can influence investor judgments even when key elements of a firm's historical guidance content are held constant. Data Availability: Contact the authors.