Abstract I study the effects of the U.S. fiscal policy response to the Great Recession, accounting for both standard tools and financial sector interventions. A nonlinear model calibrated to the United States allows me to study the state-dependent effects of different fiscal policies. I combine the model with data on the fiscal policy response to find that the fall in consumption would have been one-third larger in the absence of that response, for a cumulative loss of 7.18%. Transfers and bank recapitalizations yielded the largest fiscal multipliers through new transmission channels that arise from linkages between household and bank balance sheets.

We study the aggregate consequences of dynamic lending relationships in a model of heterogeneous banks facing financial frictions. We estimate the model’s loan demand system on administrative loan-level data: the market power implied by the estimated strength and persistence of relationships yields a long run reduction in credit of 5.9%. Relationships amplify the negative real effects of credit supply shocks, but mute those of negative credit demand shocks. In a financial crisis which destroys 25% of bank net worth, for example, loan volume drops more than twice as much in our baseline model than in a competitive analog with no relationships, but banks recapitalize faster.

We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained.

We develop a simple model of concentrated lending where lenders have incentives for evergreening loans by offering better terms to firms that are close to default. We detect such lending behavior using loan-level supervisory data for the United States. Banks that own a larger share of a firm's debt provide distressed firms with relatively more credit at lower interest rates. Building on this empirical validation, we incorporate the theoretical mechanism into a dynamic heterogeneous-firm model to show that evergreening affects aggregate outcomes, resulting in lower interest rates, higher levels of debt, and lower productivity.