We examine how inventory overproduction among high fixed costs firms affects these firms’ contemporaneous and future accounting performance, and how financial analysts and the stock market incorporate implications of these relations in their reactions. We find that higher fixed costs firms engaging in opportunistic overproduction are able to increase their contemporaneous return on assets (ROAs), but only those higher fixed costs firms that also experience inventory increases, sales declines, and issue common stock also experience declines in their future accounting performance. We further find that financial analysts are aware of this phenomenon and appropriately reduce their forecasts of future earnings per share (EPS) for higher fixed costs firms that experience sales declines and inventory increases. In general, we do not find that the stock market penalizes such opportunistic overproduction.

ABSTRACT Debtholders’ demand has been widely discussed as a key determinant of conservatism but clear causal evidence is not yet established. Using a natural experiment setting, wherein a Delaware court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors in near insolvent Delaware companies extend to creditors, we predict and find that firms subject to the ruling significantly increased their accounting conservatism. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in conservatism is more pronounced in near insolvent Delaware firms with stronger boards, confirming that the court ruling takes effect through the channel of the board of directors. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of conservatism and near insolvency status, and controlling for potential confounding factors and other stakeholders’ demand for conservatism. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence to support the causal relation between debtholders’ demand and accounting conservatism previously suggested in the literature, and offers some insights into the role of the board of directors in financial reporting.

We examine whether the level of trust in a country affects investors' perception and utilization of information transmitted by firms through financial disclosure. Specifically, we investigate the effect of societal trust on investor reactions to corporate earnings announcements. We test two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, corporate earnings announcements are perceived as more credible by investors in more trusting societies and, therefore, elicit stronger investor reactions. On the other hand, societal trust mitigates outside investors' concern of moral hazard and reduces the value of corporate earnings announcements to them, thereby weakening their reactions to these events. We analyze the abnormal trading volume and abnormal stock return variance during the earnings announcement period in a large sample of firm-year observations across 25 countries, and we find that both measures of investor reactions to earnings announcements are significantly higher in more trusting countries. We also find that the positive effect of societal trust on investor reactions to earnings news is more pronounced when a country's investor protection and disclosure requirements are weaker, suggesting that trust acts as a substitute for formal institutions; when a country's average education level is lower, consistent with less educated people relying more on trust in making economic decisions; and when firm-level information asymmetry is higher, supporting the notion that trust plays a more important role in poorer information environments.

We study the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Our model shows that the relation may be either positive or negative depending on parameter values. Asset liquidity improves stock liquidity more for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets (i.e., firms with less growth opportunities and financially constrained firms). Empirically, we find a positive and economically large relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Consistent with our model, the relation is more positive for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets. Our results also shed light on the value of holding liquid assets.

ABSTRACT This study examines whether the ideological orientation of the audit partner and audit committee members—defined as their personal belief systems and inclinations, including their attitude toward risk, ambiguity, and novelty—has an impact on engagement partner selection and the effectiveness of oversight in the financial reporting process. Drawing on prior evidence that the two main US political parties reflect different ideologies, we hand‐collect political donation data to construct ideological scores for audit partners and audit committee members. Our findings highlight several intriguing relationships. First, audit committees are more likely to select an ideologically dissimilar partner. Second, greater ideological dissimilarity between these two key monitors is associated with higher financial reporting quality. The effects of financial reporting quality are most pronounced among more effective audit committees and when audit partners have longer tenure with the client. These effects are incremental to both social connections between the audit partner and audit committee and to ideological differences between these parties and the CEO and CFO. Overall, the results support the notion that ideological dissimilarity between audit partners and audit committees can foster effective oversight of the financial reporting process. Moreover, ideological dissimilarity appears to be a useful and rational cue in audit partner selection decisions.