This article studies a security design problem featuring flexible information acquisition. To raise liquidity, a seller issues a security backed by her asset in place at the price she proposes to a buyer. Before deciding whether to accept the offer, the buyer can acquire costly information about the underlying asset. This case differs from the existing literature on security design, in that the buyer has the full flexibility of choosing not only the amount of resources to spend in information acquisition, but also how to allocate them, depending on the shape of the security. Debt is shown to be the unique optimal security for the seller, as its payoff is the least sensitive to the value of its underlying asset. This minimizes the buyer’s incentive to acquire information and mitigates the resulting adverse selection. I do not assume monotonicity of the feasible securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on information structures. Instead, I identify conditions for general information costs that support the results.

We characterize the properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game. An impatient firm sells shares to competitive investors. The firm can signal its private information about the fundamental by retaining a fraction of the shares. In addition, the firm can commit to disclosing information according to a set of accounting rules chosen ex ante. Information disclosure reduces signaling cost so that perfect disclosure is optimal. When perfect disclosure is impossible, the optimal accounting rule features a lower bound and a summary statistic of the fundamental. The interpretation of the lower bound is consistent with accounting conservatism, and the statistic summarizes the information most relevant to the firm׳s valuation. The justification for accounting conservatism relies on the existence of information asymmetry and the infeasibility of perfect accounting disclosure. This is consistent with the conjecture of LaFond and Watts (2008) that information asymmetry calls for accounting conservatism.

Players receive a return to investment that is increasing in the proportion of others who invest and the state and incur a small cost for acquiring information about the state. Their information is reflected in a stochastic choice rule, specifying the probability of a signal leading to investment. If discontinuous stochastic choice rules are infinitely costly, there is a unique equilibrium as costs become small, in which actions are a best response to a uniform (Laplacian) belief over the proportion of others investing. Infeasibility of discontinuous stochastic choice rules captures the idea that it is impossible to perfectly distinguish states that are arbitrarily close together and is both empirically documented and satisfied by many natural micro-founded cost functionals on information. Our results generalize global game selection results and establish that they do not depend on the specific additive noise information structure.

We propose a theory of security design in financing entrepreneurial production, positing that the investor can acquire costly information on the entrepreneur’s project before making the financing decision. When the entrepreneur has enough bargaining power in security design, the optimal security helps incentivize both efficient information acquisition and efficient financing. Debt is optimal when information is not very valuable for production, whereas the combination of debt and equity is optimal when information is valuable. If, instead, the investor has sufficiently strong bargaining power in security design or can acquire information only after financing, equity is optimal

We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the nature of information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks’ exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Disclosure of banks’ idiosyncratic shortfalls of funds does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resultant reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs.