We study the relationship between the behavior of a CEO’s ancestors and firm performance. To do so, we collect detailed information on emigrants from Italian municipalities during the Age of Mass Migration (1892–1924) from Ellis Island ships lists. We adopt an epidemiological approach complemented with an instrumental variables strategy and find that Italian firms managed by a CEO who belongs to a family with past emigration experience tend to perform better and to be more productive. In line with an inter-generational transmission of attitudes hypothesis, we show a positive relationship between the emigration experience of a CEO’s ancestors and alternative measures of corporate risk-taking. In addition, we find a positive relationship between having an ancestor who emigrated during the Age of Mass Migration and FDI to the United States. We also provide evidence that these CEOs have better managerial practices.

Prior literature finds that staggered state-level adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) significantly constrains labor mobility. Using the IDD as an exogenous shock to labor mobility, we find that firms headquartered in states that adopt the IDD gravitate towards issuing short-term debt for external debt financing. We examine three mechanisms—default risk, information asymmetry, and agency cost mitigation—through which labor mobility restrictions affect debt maturity. Our results provide support for the information asymmetry mechanism, which suggests that firms are more inclined to use short-term debt when their information environment deteriorates. We find that in the wake of IDD adoption, firms tend to utilize short-term debt only in corporate bond markets and their debt maturity profiles become more concentrated.