On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock price effects due to the simultaneous occurrence of the positive real effect of monitoring and the opposing information effect. (ii) The combination of board monitoring and monitoring by other parties prevents assessing the value relevance of board monitoring in isolation. (iii) The confounding effect of a simultaneous successor appointment typically generates an upward biased estimate. Based on an analysis of price effects and trading volumes at announcement, we conclude that monitoring by the supervisory board is valued by investors: Forced departures of executive directors, also without a successor appointment, are value relevant in the Netherlands where external control mechanisms and shareholder control were virtually absent in the period studied (1991–2000).

We explore the origins of the intergenerational association in entrepreneurship using Swedish adoption data that allow us to quantify the relative importance of prebirth and postbirth factors. We find that parental entrepreneurship increases the probability of children’s entrepreneurship by about 60%. For adoptees, both biological and adoptive parents make significant contributions to this association. These contributions, however, are quite different in size. Postbirth factors account for twice as much as prebirth factors in our decomposition of the intergenerational association in entrepreneurship. We investigate several candidate explanations for this large postbirth factor and present suggestive evidence in favor of role modeling.